Requirements for the Study of Time and Action in Polo's Notion of Law... and in Jurisprudence

Abstract

Polian legal thought cannot be explained purely and simply by holding that titularity would be the gracious concession of the legislator, expressed in a law or in objective law, from which the subjective law is derived, consisting in a faculty or potestas for the achievement of a social purpose. This is due to the fact that a good part of the current understanding of notions such as titularity, faculty, system, etc., are born from a determined primary organization and a gnoseological load that is very specific, outside of which they do not function. The theory of knowledge of Polo, together with his anthropology, is incompatible with the philosophical foundations on which a good part of the current understandings of law are based. This reinforces the necessity of understanding the basic Polian legal notions as they function in history.