Love as Donation and Transcendence

Blanca Castilla de Cortázar Real Academia de Doctores (Spain) Pontifical Theological Institute John Paul II (Madrid) blancascor@gmail.com RECEIVED: September 16, 2016 ACCEPTED: January 3, 2021 DEFINITIVE VERSION: July 24, 2022

Translation of "Amor donal y trascendencia" *Miscelánea Poliana*, 57 (2017) 29-53.

http://www.leonardopolo.net/revista/mp57.htm.

ABSTRACT: Philosophy poses the question about the relationship between being and love, trying to progress in finding a rational explanation of that experience. In this paper we offer an approach to the issue through two contemporary authors, Karol Wojtyla and Leonardo Polo, whose thoughts complement one another. It has been indicated that Wojtyla's novel proposals demand an ontology of its own for anthropology. Well, it seems that Polo develops one –that he calls *transcendental anthropology–* on which Wojtyla's thought can be grounded, united with the Polian philosophical tradition. That is why a joint development of both thoughts could prove very fruitful.

KEYWORDS: Love, Give, reciprocity, spousal meaning, triadic reality, ontology of love, image of God

hat is love? How does a person conceptualize it? What is its ontological stature? Who has not fallen in love? Who is not aware that it is not only possible, but sublime, to promise and to commit oneself and – who even does not dare– to get engaged to someone, defying time itself? Who does not recognize the fidelity between loved ones as one of the noblest things that gives meaning to existence?

And who would not wish to be loved in that way? Isn't it true, besides-deep down- that we know, when we love, we are close to God and resemble Him?

1. LOVE AS DONATION AND ITS STRUCTURE

Karol Wojtyla stated on several occasions his belief that "Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it".¹ His reflection starts from experience and from his phenomenological description, in search of the foundation of his being, and if we were we to look for a synthetic description of what he understands by love, it would be this: 'an unselfish gift.'²

Not everybody explains love as "gift of self" though this explanation has classical roots. Furthermore, a broad reflection on gift has been carried out by French authors throughout the twentieth century. Starting from cultural anthropology, Marcel Mauss presents "giving as the most ancient social way of exchange, based on the triad giving-receiving-returning, a triple demand that refers not only to economic goods but also to ceremonials and rituals.³ Later, other thinkers extend the priority

¹ JOHN PAUL II, Enc. *Redemptor Hominis*, 1979, n. 10.

² JOHN PAUL II, "*El don desinteresado*" (The Unselfish Gift) in LEONARDI, Mauro, *Come Gesù*, Ed. Ares, Milano 2014. Spanish trans.: *Como Jesús*, ed. Palabra 2015, pp. 263-277. Posthumous article recently published in Polish in AAS, 98, t. III (2006, 628-638), with no mention of the date and circumstances in which it was written.

³ Cf. M. MAUSS, *Ensayo sobre el don. Forma y función del intercambio en las sociedades arcaicas*, ed. Kartz, Buenos Aires, 2009. Cf. also M. GODELIER, *El enigma del don*, ed. Paidós, Barcelona 1998.

of gift to all societies, described as "any provision of goods and services, with no guarantee of a return or compensation, aimed to establish, foster or re-establish the social bond between persons."⁴ Based on many observations, authors like M. Henry and J.L. Marion developed a phenomenology of giving: in C. Bruaire and J. Maritain we can find an outline of the ontology of giving and in E. Levinas and P. Ricoeur, an ethical design with or without reciprocity. All these are disparate approaches, sometimes within a complicated discussion, riddled with aporias, in Derrida's words⁵.

Now, remaining in the same cultural context but without depending on those authors, "gift" appears as the right framework to discuss love, and the philosophers we are talking about today approach the issue precisely from the point of view of gift. A framework that, as we said, has antecedents in the great classical authors. Thus, Aquinas states: "a gift is properly an unreturnable giving, as Aristotle says -i.e., a thing which is not given with the intention of a return- and it thus contains the idea of a gratuitous donation. Now, the reason for donation being gratuitous is love; since therefore do we give something to anyone gratuitously forasmuch as we wish him well. So, what we first give him is the love whereby we wish him well. Hence it is manifest that love has the nature of a first gift, through which all free gifts are given."⁶

This approach allows us to draw at least two conclusions: first, gift and love are two issues intrinsically connected,⁷ and second, loving donation places itself on another plane; it is something more than a *do ut des*. Upon continuation, we will present this issue from four different points of view.

⁴ J.T. GODBOUT, A CAILLÉ, *L'esprit du don*, ed. La découverte, Paris 2000, p. 29.

⁵ Cf. J. DERRIDA, "Justicia y perdón", in *¡Palabra! Instantáneas filosóficas*, ed. Trotta, Madrid 2001, p. 96. To see a group of aporias, cf. U. FERRER, *Acción, deber, donación. Dos dimensiones éticas inseparables de la acción*, ed. Dykinson, Madrid 2015, pp. 139-209.

⁶ Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 38, a. 2, c.

⁷ This becomes all the more obvious when one finds that Love and Gift are the two names that Aquinas uses to describe the Third Person of the Trinity –the Love person. Cf. Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, qq. 37-38.

1.1. Love, triadic reality

First, the structure of giving is triadic. Even though traces of triadic relations can be found both in the Cosmos and in the human being,⁸ they are not frequent. Usually human complexity, – Polo affirms– "is organized considering the criterion of duality: Body and soul, will and intelligence, inner being and outside world, subject and object, individual and society.... These are some human dimensions where duality can be found. Duplicity (hypocrisy, dissimulation, pretense), on the other hand, is based on this duality. Certainly, duplicity presupposes duality and only with duality is it possible".⁹ Love can be approached from the perspective of duality, as has been frequent among theoreticians of love. It should be enough to remember the difference between eros and agape, that, in Anders Nygren's pen¹⁰ are presented in a dualistic and incompatible way.

However, considered from the point of view of gift, love shows a triadic structure, as we said. With simple brilliance St. Augustine already pointed out that in love, one should consider the lover, the beloved and love, a reflection of the divine triad, Father, Son and Holy Spirit.¹¹ According to Polo's terminology, the structure of giving is: giving-accepting-gift.¹²

1.2. Love and reciprocity

Turning now to the structure of the gift, let us focus on the giving and accepting. Considered from the point of view of action they seem to be hierarchically related, as apparently can be gathered from Acts 20:35: "It is more blessed to give than to receive." This theory is strengthened if we consider that only he who possesses, gives, whereas he who receives, lacks something. From this viewpoint, one can easily understand how hard it is to give a

 $^{^{\}rm 8}$ The same happens with family, which is a triadic reality: father, mother, and child.

⁹ L. POLO, "La coexistencia del hombre", en Escritos menores (1991-2000), Obras Completas, vol. XVI, p. 55.

¹⁰ A. NYGREN, *Eros och agape*, original edition in Swedish, Stockholm, 1930. Trans. in Spanish: *Eros y ágape*. *La noción cristiana del amor y sus transformaciones*, ed. Sagitario, 1969.

¹¹ Cf. SAINT AUGUSTINE, *De Trinitate*, 8, 10,14.

¹² Cf. L. POLO, *Antropología trascendental I. La persona humana*, ed. Eunsa, Pamplona, 1999, pp. 217-228.

present to someone who has an abundance of things or almost everything. Or, looking at another example from the field of education: there is no teacher if there are no students, and students not only receive but also, in a certain way, give to the teacher, with their attention, and allowing him or her to deepen in the issues and to give his or her best. Still, there exists a certain hierarchy between the teacher and the student. He who knows gives more than the ignorant. But if the gift is related to love, giving and accepting are in the same category –as we will see later– and bring about the same kind of happiness, as it happens with loving and being loved: two sides of the same coin.

The importance of this issue is better understood from the point of view of correspondence, which is at the center of the discussion on giving. Is it necessary to repay when you receive a gift? or is it not? Even though the gift is gratuitous, even though it does not strictly require giving back, it seems there should be at least some sort of gratitude. In short, a gift must have some kind of response from the side of the beneficiary. This issue arises again when we think of debt, at least of the awareness of being indebted, and, seen exclusively from the level of the action or from the level of having, it can give rise to several aporias.¹³ But, at the heart of this discussion lies something deeper than the relationship between giver and receiver, since, if it is not accepted, the very gift is thwarted, losing its meaning and even its very being as a gift.

This is a perennial issue that arises in the great authors, even if in a basic manner, namely, that correspondence is essential for love to exist: "Indeed, this is the principal thing in the lover's intention –states Aquinas–: to be loved in return by the object of his love. To this, then, the lover's main effort inclines to attract his beloved to the love of himself; unless this occurs, his love must come to naught (dissolves)¹⁴."

¹³ Most of them have been put forward by Derrida, and are included in Cf. U. FERRER, *Acción, deber, donación* pp. 160-167.

¹⁴ AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles, l. III, chap. 151. «Hoc enim est praecipuum in intentione diligentis, ut a dilecto reametur: ad hoc enim praecipue studium diligentis tendit, ut ad sui amorem dilectum attrahat; et nisi accidat, oportet dilectionem dissolvi». (Translator's note: English translation by Vernon J. Bourke translates dissolvi as "come to naught," here I use the more literal

This unexceptionable assertion poses several questions. Is reciprocity essential for love to exist? Is unrequited love true love? Does this mean that, if love is unrequited, it should literally be 'dissolved'? Lévinas, for example, suggests the possibility of an ethical gift without reciprocity, without compensation. We will not focus on this approach, I simply just wanted to point it out, as well as some poems of Spanish anthology, that also make a case for an unrequited love: For example, a Spanish tune goes:

"Love and expect nothing

that's the best of affections;

I love you without hope of love in return:

so tender is my love for you."

And the male lead of the Spanish light opera La alegría de la huerta sings:

"My dear highlander,

so tender is my love for you,

that even if you marry other man

I will never forget you."

These verses speak of many things: of unselfishness, of loving the other for his or her own sake... On the other hand, an unrequited love can be alive as long as there is hope, and, while there is life, a love can wait. Now can we speak of true love, when it is not accepted?

The issue becomes clearer if we consider the gratuitous nature of love. This gratuitous nature is not well understood if we think that the gift expects something in return. That 'something' is the mistake. "Love is with love repaid" is a great truth, and excludes the idea of an exchange for something or of something being owed. There is no 'something' that can repay love and its gratuitous character. However, strictly speaking, "love is 'repaid' with love" indicates, in turn, a requited love, since lover-gift is such for the sake of the beloved-received, and it is in this intertwining that love really starts. Love is not a single

[&]quot;dissolve" in order to follow the rapporteur's line of thinking).

phenomenon, where the lover is self-sufficient, but a triadic or tridimensional one. Requital is not a 'payment,' but the very structure and dynamics of love. 15

Let us go, then, to the heart of the question. Why is it that, speaking of absolutes, love does not exist without requital, as Polo asserted several times? ¹⁶ This is a result of the same structure of love, which is not a unilateral reality. There is no love without a lover and a loved one.¹⁷ And there is no lover without beloved, nor gift if it is not accepted. Therefore, the fulfillment of love only starts with reciprocity, when I am of the other and the other is mine. These possessive pronouns, yours and mine, are intrinsic components of love. Viladrich puts it in these exact words: "The lover-being constitutes itself by the beloved (...). The lover's gift of himself is a movement whose perfection -to really become a gift, that is, that all I have is yours- is achieved when it is welcomed by the beloved, who accepts as his own the 'all I have' that the lover was offering to him. Likewise, were there no lover's gift, the beloved could not achieve acceptance. Reciprocity is in its radical structure a reciprocal intertwining, where lover and beloved manage to fulfill themselves, one through the other, precisely as gift and as acceptance."18 So, we say, with Aquinas and Polo: love does not exist without requital.

¹⁵ Love debts are a *plus ultra* (still further) coming from the entire and authentic character of the gift and acceptance. These, by virtue of freewill, become biographical identities, that is, a part of our own being and, inasmuch as they are united lovers, they are co-identities.

¹⁶ Cf., Among other places: L. POLO, "Tener, dar, esperar", in *Filosofía y economía*, Eunsa, Pamplona 2012, p. 246. (There exists an English version, *Having, Giving, Hoping*).

¹⁷ Thus, Edith Stein asserts that: "The gift of self leads to the union; it does not reach fullness but through the acceptance by the beloved one. So love demands, in order to reach fullness, the mutual donation of persons. This is the only way for love to be a full assertion, since a person does not open to the other but in the giving of himself. Only in the union is a proper knowledge between persons possible. Love (...) is both receiving and a free act (...) But love, in its highest fullness, is not fulfilled except in God: in the mutual love of the divine persons, in the divine Being giving Himself to Himself." E. STEIN, *Ser finito y Ser eterno* (*Finite Being and Eternal Being*) in Obras Completas, III, Ed. Monte Carmelo, Burgos 2007, pp. 1041-1042. Own translation.

¹⁸ P.J. VILADRICH, *Por qué y para qué "uno con una para toda la vida"*. La cuestión de la unidad de vida en el amante, en la correspondencia con el amado y en la unión conyugal (Why and What for Marriage Should be "a Man With a

1.3. Giving and Acceptance

We have pointed out that, depending on the point of view, both moments could be hierarchically related, and giving could be more than acceptance. This is the dynamic if considered from the sphere of having, where it can be fairly stated that "no one gives what he doesn't have." But this is not the only possible point of view. Giving can be also considered from the point of view of being, from who someone *is* instead of what he or she has.¹⁹

Considered from the point of view of personal being, giving and acceptance are not hierarchically related, but have the same status. Polo states clearly that "acceptance is not less than giving." This introduces us to the giving character of the person, "a subject typical of transcendental anthropology."²⁰ Polo distinguishes clearly between the sphere of having and the sphere of giving, both corresponding to the difference between nature and person, and explains that the distinctive trait of human nature with regard to that of lower or higher beings is its ability to give and to give himself.²¹ This is why the gift, the same as love, is strictly speaking something characteristic of the person, both in giving and acceptance.²²

For his part, Karol Wojtyla coincides with Polo's initial approach and develops new aspects of it. Thus, they coincide in asserting

Woman Forever." The Issue of the Unity of Life in the Lover, in the Reciprocity with the Beloved and in the Conjugal Union), in «Ius Canonicum» 55 (2015) p. 550.

¹⁹ This implies a difference between person and nature, a difference started in a certain way by Aquinas, who distinguished an essential and a nominal or personal sense both in gift and in love, so as to assert that 'love' is also a person's name. Cf. AQUINAS, *Summa Theologiae*, I, qq. 37 and 38.

²⁰ Cf. L. POLO, Antropología trascendental I. La persona humana, p. 220.

²¹ Cf. L. POLO, "Tener y dar" in *Sobre la existencia cristiana*, Eunsa, 1996, p. 103-135. L. POLO, "Tener, dar, esperar", in *Filosofía y economía*, Eunsa, Pamplona 2012, p. 207-268. (There exists an English version: *Having, Giving, Hoping.*)

²² Cf. L. POLO, *Antropología trascendental I. La persona humana*, p. 220. Polo's remarks on giving and accepting develop that God is the one who gives –and later accepts– to the man, and the man is the one who accepts God's gift and, later on, he or she delivers it to God. Appropriate as this may be, Polian anthropology appears to be lacking a deeper discussion on dual transcendentality at an anthropological level, that is, in the relationships between human persons.

that giving and acceptance have both the same category: "The giving and the accepting of the gift interpenetrate, so that the giving itself becomes acceptance, and acceptance is transformed into giving."²³ Their approaches also agree in that the person is a gift of God's creation, since "every creature bears within it the sign of the original and fundamental gift –Wojtyla points out–. The concept of 'giving' (...) indicates the one who gives and the one who accepts the gift, and also the relationship that is established between them. (...) In the narrative of the creation of the visible world, giving has a meaning only with regard to man (...) who, as "image of God," is capable of understanding the meaning of gift."²⁴

Now, from these common premises, we discover in Wojtyla an extension of the meaning of a gift accepted. Certainly, the first gift is the same person, who, in his turn, is able to accept gifts: "Man appears in creation as the one who accepted the world as a gift."²⁵ But there is even more, man appears "as the one who, in the midst of the 'world,' accepted the other man as a gift"²⁶: God gives him another person.

John Paul II emphasizes that, in order to understand the meaning itself of the gift, we must consider that a human being, constitutively speaking, is something more than loneliness, since in him, human personal relationships are also constitutive (considered as a call to the communion of persons). "The communion of persons means existing in a mutual 'for,' in a relationship of mutual gift."²⁷ In this sense his development –not found in Polo, although it is implicit in the meaning that the latter gives to co-existence– that God creates a man 'from the beginning,' and makes him dual, male and female (Gn 1:27), helps

²³ JOHN PAUL II, *Theology of the Body*. From the Weekly Audiences of His Holiness September 5, 1979 – November 28, 1984, p. 45. © Copyright 2005 – Libreria Editrice Vaticana - © Copyright 1979- 1984 - L'Osservatore Romano. Cf. *Man and Woman He Created Them. A Theology of Body*, Pauline Books & Media, Boston 2006.

²⁴ JOHN PAUL II, The Redemption of the Body and Sacramentality of Marriage. (From now on cited as Theology of the Body), audience on 2.I.1980, p. 35.

²⁵ Ibidem.

²⁶ Ibidem.

²⁷ JOHN PAUL II, Theology of the Body, audience on 9.I.1980, p. 36.

to clarify the issue²⁸: "'He created' means, in this case, even more –he comments–, since it means that He gave mutually one to the other. He gave to the man the femininity of that human being similar to him, He made her his help and, at the same time, gave the man to the woman. Therefore, from the very beginning the man is given by God to another. (...) Woman is given to man so that he can understand himself, and *vice versa*, man is given to woman with the same aim. They must confirm their humanity to each other, being amazed at their double richness."²⁹

Woman 'is given' to man by the Creator, and received, that is to say, accepted, by him as a gift. Acceptance of the woman by the man, and the same way of accepting her –as the Creator wished, i.e., 'by herself,' – turn out to be a first donation, so that the woman, in giving herself, 'discovers' herself. When the whole dignity of the gift is ensured in this acceptance through the offer of what she is in the whole truth of her humanity, she reaches the inner depth of her person and full possession of herself.³⁰ But at the same time, woman is given to someone who had already been entrusted to her (cf. Gn 2:18), since "God entrusts the human being to her in a special way."³¹

If at the beginning of Creation, God creates humanity as male and female, we could intuitively state that, when creating in the image of Himself, God, who is one in nature and Triune in persons, created a nature –the human nature–, dual in persons. This intuition is contained, moreover, in the well-known 'unity of the two' that John Paul II talked about, in the image of the 'unity of the three.'³² Polo describes human person as dual, and John Paul II adds that he is uni-dual, relational, ontological and

²⁸ As already known, there are two accounts of Creation in Genesis, and in the second one Adam appears to come into existence before Eve. However, current exegesis, proposed by John Paul II, reads Genesis 2 in the light of Genesis 1:26-27, where both male and female come into existence together. So Genesis 2 is a symbolic text that should be read without contradicting the previous passage. Cf. my work: B. CASTILLA DE CORTÁZAR, ¿Fue creado el varón antes que la mujer? *Reflexiones en torno a la Antropología de la Creación*, Rialp, Madrid 2005. Also in "Annales Theologici," Edizioni Ares, Roma, vol. 6 (1992/2) 319-366.

³⁰ Cf. JOHN PAUL II, Theology of the Body, audience on 6.II.1980, p. 45.

³¹ JOHN PAUL II, Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem, 1988, n. 30.

³² Cf. Ibidem, nn. 6-7.

complementary,³³ an original and irreducible difference with the characteristic of forming a peculiar unity: the *unity of the two*.³⁴

1.4. The third moment of love

In Theology, which considers three different persons in the divinity, who has revealed himself as love (Cf. 1 Jn, 4:8), it is easy, say, to recognize the three different elements of the structure of love in the three divine persons. However, it is not so easy for anthropology, since the human being is, from the beginning, only two different ways of being equal -male and female. How is the third element of love to be expressed when we only have two persons, one who gives and one who accepts?

Polo presents the difficulty: "giving and accepting imply the gift. This means, in the end, that the structure of giving is triune and not dual. However, since human person is dual or co-existent, but in no way triune, man needs his essence to complete the gifting structure. Man can only give gifts through his essence."³⁵ For Polo it is clear that "in transcendental Anthropology we attain the giving and accepting duality, a giving and an accepting characteristic of the human personal co-existing. However, if gift is to be understood as transcendental, we must admit a third element, so that duality is transcended. Thus, the fact that gift is personal transcends the human accepting and giving. The aperture into the person is the duality already alluded to. However, the created person is not capable of communicating his own personal character as a gift. Therefore, in man the gift must be understood as an operative expression or manifestation (...), that is, on the level of the essence."³⁶ Indeed, this assertion that a human person is not capable of communicating his own gift a personal character is consistent with the explanation that

³³ Cf. JOHN PAUL II, *Letter to Families*, 1995, nn. 7-8.

³⁴ Cf. JOHN PAUL II, *Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem*, 1988, n. 7. This teaching overcomes, as Scola explains, well-known bans of the past, (he refers, for example, to SAINT AUGUSTIN, *De Trinitate*, 12, 5, 5; and to AQUINAS, *Summa Theológica*, I, q. 93, a. 6), while demanding, in addition, an expansion of the Judeo-Chistian teaching on the image of God. Cf. SCOLA, A., *La experiencia humana elemental*, p. 36.

 ³⁵ L. POLO, Antropología trascendental I. La persona humana, pp. 220-221.
³⁶ Ibidem, p. 223.

parents can only transmit their nature to the child, whereas the gift that renders the child a person is given by God.

However, in the human sphere love does exist, and it does not cease to be a triadic reality, so we must find out how the triad manifests itself. In this sense, the progress made by John Paul II regarding the *imago Dei* as 'unity of the two,' which we mentioned above, further clarifies the issue. For Karol Wojtyla the fullness of the image, that he always regards as a trinitarian one, does not appear in an isolated person, but when two persons live a communion of persons between them. *"Man -states Wojtylabecomes the image of God not so much in the moment of solitude as in the moment of communion.* Right 'from the beginning,' he is not only an image in which the solitude of a person who rules the world is reflected, but also, and essentially, an image of an inscrutable divine communion of persons."³⁷

The Unity of the two permits the discovery of a 'three' in the human sphere, that is not embodied in another person, but that implies a different reality of each of the lovers taken separately. That is, when each of them lives for the other, since mutual reciprocity generates the union, this union between them would be the third element of love. In the human sphere, therefore, the triadic structure would be the lover, the beloved and the union between them. So, in the structure of human love, the very union constitutes the first 'three.'³⁸ It is a real three, because the union between the you and the I could very well not exist, though it is not a different person but a 'single we.' That union-being constitutes an *esse* of a higher order than the personal *esse*. The union-being turns then into a particular *additionally*, different to the *additionally/in addition* that Polo often uses to describe every human person.³⁹

³⁷ JOHN PAUL II, Theology of the Body, audience on 14.XI.1979, p. 25.

³⁸ This idea is developed in the works of P.J. Viladrich on the structure and dynamics of love. Cf. P.J. VILADRICH, *Por qué y para qué "uno con una para toda la vida"*, art. cit. pp. 550 ff.

³⁹ To describe the person, Polo often uses the adverb "additionally" or "in addition" (además), in addition to the operation, in addition to his natural endowment, in addition to his essential perfection. This is consistent with the distinction essentia-esse, which places the person in the sphere of being, 'the one beyond the essence' (essence as different from the act of being). Cf. L. POLO,

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2. LOVE, UNSELFISH GIFT IN KAROL WOJTYLA.

Once we have analyzed the triadic structure of the gifting love let us discuss how John Paul II formulates love as an unselfish gift. Its anthropological foundation can be seen in that famous sentence of *Gaudium et Spes*, perhaps introduced by himself, that he would repeat time and again in many documents of his Pontificate: "Man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself."⁴⁰

This short text describes the two internal dimensions of the human person; his subsisting nature, that medieval thinkers used to call 'incommunicable,' and his relational openness, that both endows him with maximum communication, and allows him to reach his fullness. The first personal feature, also known as uniqueness, refers to a someone that has something absolute, which makes him or her to be always an end and not a means, as Kant brilliantly explained.⁴¹ That is why a person must be loved for his or her own sake, in the same way as he or she is loved by God. As it is known, this Kantian assertion is the starting point and the grounds for the theory on love that John Paul II developed in his important study Love and Responsibility,⁴² a subject on which he would reflect throughout his intellectual life,⁴³ searching for its anthropological foundation in his work *The* Acting Person⁴⁴, and for the theological one in his great work on the Theology of the Body.⁴⁵

The second dimension that we will refer to is the relational openness of the human person, described as a sincere gift of himself. This theory could complete Kant's categorical

Why a Transcendental Anthropology?, Leonardo Polo Institute of Philosophy Press, South Bend, Indiana (USA), 2014, p. 43. Cf. also J.A. GARCÍA GONZÁLEZ, Y además. Escritos sobre la antropología transcendental de Polo, Delta ed., San Sebastian-Donostia 2008, p.123.

⁴⁰ II VATICAN COUNCIL, Pastoral Const. *Gaudium et Spes*, n. 24.

⁴¹ I. KANT, *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres*, (Groundwork for the Methaphysics of Morals) Ariel, 1999, § 429,10, p. 189.

⁴² Cf. K. WOJTYLA, Love and Responsibility.

⁴³ Cf. K. WOJTYLA, *El don del amor* (The Gift of Love). Palabra, Madrid 1999, group of articles on the subject, written throughout many years.

⁴⁴ Cf. K. WOJTYLA, Love and Responsibility.

⁴⁵ GIOVANNI PAOLO II, *Theology of body*.

imperative, since although every person is an end in himself, is not an end for himself: the end of a person is always another person.

2.1. When the gift is another person

For Karol Wojtyla "the awareness of the gift and of the donation is clearly imprinted in the biblical image of creation ,"⁴⁶ above all because, when God called man to life ('male and female created he them' (Gn 1, 26:7)), at that moment, to create meant even more, it means that the received gift, received by he and by she, is another person. In John Paul II's words, "God gave to the man the femininity of that human being similar to him, He made her his help and, at the same time, gave the man to the woman. Therefore, from the very beginning the man is given by God to another (...) Woman is given to man so that he can understand himself, and *vice versa*, man is given to woman with the same aim. They must confirm their humanity to each other."⁴⁷

At the beginning of Creation, therefore, we find something unique: the gift bestowed is another person. This is an important issue to delve into the mystery of love. "Human beings do not only live side by side –John Paul II asserts–, but in different references: they live one for the other: they are brother or sister for each other, husband and wife, friend, teacher, or pupil. It could seem there is nothing extraordinary in that (...). That image *thickens* in certain moments and it is precisely then, in those 'thickenings,' when the said gift of one man to another is made."⁴⁸ It is then that one can realize, with regard to another person, that "God has given you to me."

One of those 'thickenings' occurs in parents when they have a child. Eve expressed it in astonishment, when she had her first descendant: "I have gotten a man with the help of the Lord" (Gn 4:1), which is to say: "God has given you to me." Indeed, "motherhood is the first way man is entrusted to man. 'God wants to give you another man,' that is to say, God wants to entrust you that man, and to entrust means that God trusts you, He trusts that you know how to accept that gift, that you know how to embrace

⁴⁶ JOHN PAUL II, "*El don desinteresado*," p. 265 (The Unselfish Gift).

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

⁴⁸ Ibidem, p. 263.

him in your heart, which entails repaying this gift with the gift of yourself." $^{\!\!\!\!\!^{49}}$

John Paul II continues: "God really gives us other persons: brothers, sisters in humanity apart from our parents. Then, with the passing of time, as we grow, he always places in our lives new persons. And, each one of them represents a gift for us, in such a way that we can say to each one of them: "God has given you to me." This realization becomes a source of inner richness for each one of us."⁵⁰

"God –he acknowledges– has given me plenty of persons, young and old, boys and girls, fathers and mothers, widows, healthy and sick. Whenever He would give them to me, he would also entrust them to me, and today I see that I could write a monograph on each of them (...) There were among them simple people, workmen in the factory; students and professors were there too, physicians and lawyers; there were, finally, priests and consecrated people. There were, obviously, men and women."⁵¹

2.2. Free from the freedom of gift

As it is known, in the first part of the Theology of the Body, John Paul II considers the human being as it came from God's hands, delving deeply into experience, before original sin. One result was that they both were free with the freedom of the gift.⁵² As can be noticed, in this expression the word freedom appears twice. The first time freedom is used, the meaning refers to "self-control" with which, in the state of original innocence, each person fully possessed himself and was free, unrestrained to turn himself into a gift for the other.⁵³ That meaning is obvious. What demands further explanation is the second term, 'freedom of the gift,' since

⁴⁹ Ibidem, pp. 266-267.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 266.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*, p. 274.

⁵² "Created by Love, endowed in their being with masculinity and femininity, they are both 'naked' because they are free with the freedom of gift": JOHN PAUL II, Theology of the Body, audience on 16.I.1980, p. 38.

⁵³ "We mean here freedom especially as mastery of oneself (self-control). From this aspect, this freedom is indispensable so that man may be able to "give himself," so that he may become a gift, so that he may be able to "fully discover his true self only in a sincere giving of himself " (referring to the words of the Council). Ibidem

it is necessary to previously unravel the meaning of the body. John Paul II calls it spousal (nuptial), and by that he understands the participation of the body in the unselfish gift to the other.⁵⁴

The spousal meaning of the body is double: on the one hand, human body expresses to the other that its owner is a person. Thus, Adam discovers through the body that Eve is someone like him –even though she is different–, when he says: "This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh" (Gn 2:23). And to be a person is above all to have been loved for one's own sake by God. The body is the way to recognize or affirm that we have before us a person, with his (her) well-known dignity. Second, the body is capable of expressing love. Now, the external expression corresponds to an inner love, where each one must have been reciprocally accepted by the other as a gift.⁵⁵

Once we have explained these premises we are in a better situation to understand the meaning of the "freedom of the gift" within the framework of interpersonal love, as mutual acceptance⁵⁶ that can be expressed in a variety of forms: the

⁵⁴ "Awareness of the spousal meaning of the body, connected with man's masculinity-femininity, (...) indicates a particular capacity of expressing love, in which man becomes a gift. On the other hand, the capacity and deep availability for the 'affirmation of the person' corresponds to it. This is, literally, the capacity of living the fact that the other –the woman for the man and the man for the woman– is, by means of the body, someone willed by the Creator for his or her own sake. The person is unique and unrepeatable, someone chosen by eternal Love.". Translator's note: I have changed "nuptial" for "spousal", according to the rapporteur's instructions, who later in the text explains the reason for this. JOHN PAUL II, Theology of the Body, audience on 16.I.1980, p. 40.

⁵⁵ "The affirmation of the person is nothing but acceptance of the gift, which, by means of reciprocity, creates the communion of persons. This communion is constructed from within. It comprises also the whole 'exteriority' of man, that is, everything that constitutes the pure and simple nakedness of the body in its masculinity and femininity." Ibidem.

⁵⁶ "Genesis 2:25 says even more, however. (...) Free with the freedom of the gift, man and woman could enjoy the whole truth, the whole self-evidence of man, just as God-Yahweh had revealed these things to them in the mystery of creation. "(...) the interior freedom of the gift - the disinterested gift of oneself (...) enables them both, man and woman, to find one another, since the Creator willed each of them 'for his (her) own sake' (cf. Gaudium et spes, 24). Thus man, in the first beatifying meeting, finds the woman, and she finds him. In this way he accepts her interiorly. He accepts her as she is willed "for her own sake" by the Creator, as she is constituted in the mystery of the image of God through her femininity.

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physical union of bodies, therefore, characteristic of marriage, is but one expression among others of the union between them, i.e., it is a free gift, but not the only one or the most important, precisely because the spousal meaning of the body in its sexual dimension overcomes one of its physical manifestations.⁵⁷ This proves that love is virginal at its root, that is, an unselfish gift, that gives itself to the other, transcending the physical dimension of love, and helps to understand that the call to celibacy for the sake of the Kingdom is above all a spousal vocation, that is, prompted by love, which expresses even in a more vivid way the unselfishness inherent to any true love.⁵⁸

3. LOVE AND THE SPOUSAL MEANING

In contrast to other nonsexual formulations of love, John Paul II discovers –as we are seeing–, starting from Creation, the importance of love between man and woman, otherwise seen as the very epitome of love; all other kinds of love fade in comparison to it.⁵⁹ In this sense he explains unambiguously that

Reciprocally, she accepts him in the same way, as he is willed "for his own sake" by the Creator, and constituted by him by means of his masculinity." JOHN PAUL II, Theology of the Body, audience on 16.I.1980, p. 39.

⁵⁷ The human body, oriented interiorly by the sincere gift of the person, reveals not only its masculinity or femininity on the physical plane, but reveals also such a value and such a beauty as to go beyond the purely physical dimension of 'sexuality.'" Ibidem.

⁵⁸ "Christ revealed to man and woman, over and above the vocation to marriage, another vocation namely, that of renouncing marriage, in view of the kingdom of heaven. With this vocation, he highlighted the same truth about the human person. If a man or a woman is capable of making a gift of himself for the kingdom of heaven, this proves in its turn (and perhaps even more) that there is the freedom of the gift in the human body. It means that this body possesses a full spousal meaning." JOHN PAUL II, Theology of the Body, audience on 16.I.1980, p. 41.

⁵⁹ BENEDICT XVI, *Enc. Deus caritas est* (2005), n. 2: "Let us first of all bring to mind the vast semantic range of the word 'love': we speak of love of country, love of one's profession, love between friends, love of work, love between parents and children, love between family members, love of neighbour and love of God. Amid this multiplicity of meanings, however, one in particular stands out: love between man and woman, where body and soul are inseparably joined and human beings glimpse an apparently irresistible promise of happiness. This would seem to be the very epitome of love; all other kinds of love immediately seem to fade in comparison."

the man-woman duality is designed by God, not just for marriage and procreation, but for the communion between persons, regardless of their marital status and of the circumstances of each person. Once he has explained that the gift, even the specific gift in marriage (the *una caro*) is a free expression of love, he has a deep freedom to recognize the beauty and the image of God in human love in all its circumstances, where the man-woman difference and relationship play a vital role in the communion of persons, since the complementarity of both is needed not only in marriage, but in all facets of life. Indeed, based on the principle of the mutual be 'for' the other in the interpersonal 'communion,' finds that throughout history there has been an integration, willed by God, in humanity of what is 'masculine' and what is 'feminine.'⁶⁰

Therefore, he understands spousal to mean all that is intrinsically related with the person and love. With his words: "Awareness of the spousal meaning of the body, connected with man's masculinity-femininity, (...) indicates a particular capacity of expressing love, in which man becomes a gift. On the other hand, the capacity and deep availability for the 'affirmation of the person' corresponds to it. This is, literally, the capacity of living the fact that the other –the woman for the man and the man for the woman– is, by means of the body, someone willed by the Creator for his or her own sake. The person is unique and unrepeatable, someone chosen by eternal Love."⁶¹

Therefore, spousal is not synonymous with conjugal, not even with nuptial, since it is a previous human structure, that makes the other two possible: to get engaged and to be married. It is the primordial anthropological relationship between man with regard to woman, or the latter with regard to the former, whatever their family ties or friendship bonds. Perhaps the

⁶⁰ JOHN PAUL II, Apostolic Letter *Mulieris Dignitatem*, 1988, n. 7. "To be human means to be called to interpersonal communion. The text of Genesis 2:18-25 shows that marriage is the first and, in a sense, the fundamental dimension of this call. But it is not the only one. The whole of human history unfolds within the context of this call. In this history, on the basis of the principle of mutually being 'for' the other, in interpersonal 'communion,' there develops in humanity itself, in accordance with God's will, the integration of what is 'masculine' and what is 'feminine'".

⁶¹ JOHN PAUL II, *Theology of the Body*, audience on 16.I.1980, p. 40.

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relationship between brothers and sisters can be considered as a very expressive form of this spousal character. In this sense he presents the difference between man and woman: two complementary ways of loving, the bride's and the groom's way, and finds that *the truth of woman as bride is discovered facing the bridegroom*. He describes initially the bridegroom as the one who loves and the bride as the beloved. The woman is *"the one who receives love in order to love in return,"*⁶² likewise *the man is the one who loves and is loved*.

This description captures the fact of two manners of love placed face to face, where giving and accepting are two ways of being active that are correlated, rather than an 'activite-passive'-type relationship. In this sense giving and accepting are two activities of the same status,⁶³ simply because one enables the other: the gift is meaningless if it is not accepted, so accepting is another way of giving. Man and woman both love and are loved, but in a peculiar order –he loves to be loved, she is loved to love–, which does not entail temporariness or superiority, so that neither of them is prior to or superior to the other. They both explain and give meaning to each other, are placed face to face and have the ability to form a unity , a co-being of a higher order than that of their own individualities taken one by one.

For this reason, even though each one of them has value in himself or herself, as person, since the person is ontologically relational, the force of the sexual difference lies in that it enables the 'unity of the two,' acknowledging that the difference manwoman is crucial as a backbone of the communion of persons. "The difference in the way of being human –states Viladrich– is necessary so that man and woman can be, each and between them, lover, beloved and union. But, in *what* do they love each other?, i.e., What is the content of their gift and of their

⁶² JOHN PAUL II, Apostolic Letter *Mulieris Dignitatem*, 1988, n. 29.

⁶³ "The giving and the accepting of the gift interpenetrate, so that the giving itself becomes accepting, and the acceptance is transformed into giving." John Paul II, Audience on 6.II.1980, in Theology of the Body, audience on 16.I.1980, p. 45. Polo too explains clearly that giving and accepting have the same category: "accepting is not less than giving" and "giving and accepting imply the gift." L. POLO, Antropología trascendental I. La persona humana, ed. Eunsa, Pamplona, 1999, pp. 220-221.

acceptance? In what can they be united? All that is contained in being human and what makes up the human being in the masculine or feminine way is the very 'material' of the gift and its acceptance. In this sense, the difference is an anthropological radical, indispensable if lover and beloved, when loving and by love, want to share in being, not just in acting."⁶⁴

4. TOWARDS AN ONTOLOGY OF LOVE

We all have somehow sensed in some way that realities such as love or freedom have to do in a certain way with being, or, in other words, that the radical foundation of these issues has to do with the depths of the personal reality. In order to illustrate what I mean I will refer to an experience told by Gabriel Marcel. Thinking about love and the loyalty inherent to it, he realized very clearly "Being as the place of Loyalty ($D'\hat{E}tre$ comme lieu de la Fidelité). How is it –he admits–, that this formula arising in my mind, at a given moment of time, has for me the inexhaustible inspiration of a musical theme?"⁶⁵ Time and again he would wonder in astonishment why those words had such a bright value to him, which, however, he did not manage to explain: the fact that freedom, love and loyalty are located in being and have to do directly with it.

However, one can easily realize how hard is it to access anthropological issues from classic metaphysics, where, for example, freedom is enclosed in the sphere of nature and regarded as a 'surname' of the will. As we said, for a long time anthropology has been demanding a specific ontology for itself. Well then, one of Leonardo Polo's achievements has been an expansion of ontology, where anthropology becomes a first philosophy, but on an ontological level other than that of metaphysics.⁶⁶ Polo starts from the recently rediscovered Thomist distinction between *essentia-esse* and applies it to

⁶⁴ P.J. VILADRICH, Por qué y para qué "uno con una para toda la vida"..., p. 548.

⁶⁵ G. MARCEL, *Être et Avoir*, p. 55-56, taken from Being and Having, translation by Katherine Farrer, p. 41.

⁶⁶ Cf. AAVV, Entrevista con Leonardo Polo. La distinción entre la antropología y la metafísica, in *«Studia poliana»* 13 (2011) 105-153. Cf. also L. POLO, Why a Transcendental Anthropology?, o.c.

anthropology. The person is unrepeatable, because every man has his own, not transferable act of being. In other words, the human *esse*, as distinct from essence, is the person, the other coprinciple that actualizes each man's individuated nature (transmitted by his parents). Since the person is act of being, and therefore transcendental –actualizing all formal perfections of every man–, it can be said that the soul is personal and that the body is personal, or that the whole man is personal, but not in the sense that the person is (only) the 'whole,' or in the sense that, if one of his constituent parts is missing –for example, the body after dying–, then we could no longer speak of a person.⁶⁷

Polo continues noticing that man distinguishes himself from the Cosmos both in his act of being, which is free, and in his essence, which is capable of habits. Further, it is worth mentioning the inclusion of relation in the very act of being when he describes the personal being as co-existence,⁶⁸ after stating that a person cannot be by himself for he would be a 'complete absurdity'69; not just a contradiction, but something impossible. "A sole person would be an absolute disgrace,"70 because he would have nobody to communicate with, to whom he could give himself,⁷¹ to whom he was destined. Also, if we are to identify a specific transcendental level for what is human, the same as classic philosophy distinguished a series of transcendental properties of being -unity, truth, goodness, beauty-, the personal act of being must have its own transcendental properties, which Polo designates as anthropological transcendentals.⁷² For example, freedom or intelligence would be transcendental dimensions, inasmuch as they cannot be reduced to be faculties of the nature,

⁶⁷ This has been one of the burdens that has weighed down on philosophical tradition after the well-known Boethian definition of person. Cf. B. CASTILLA DE CORTÁZAR, The Notion of Person and a Transcendental Anthropology, from Boethius to Polo. Whether the separated soul is a person, and whether the person is the whole or the esse of man, in *Journal of Polian Studies* 4 (2017) 81-117 (ISSN: 2375-7329).

⁶⁸ L. POLO, *Antropología trascendental I*: La persona humana, Eunsa, Pamplona 1999; 20032.

⁶⁹ L. POLO, La coexistencia del hombre, 1991 p. 33.

⁷⁰ L. POLO, Presente y futuro del hombre, p. 161.

⁷¹ Cf. L. POLO, Libertas transcendentalis, in *"Anuario Filosófico"* 26 (1993/3) p. 714.

⁷² Cf. L. POLO, Libertas transcendentalis, pp. 703-716.

rather they are, in a more radical sense, properties of the same personal being. And among them is love. That is why, if we were to ask ourselves again what the ontological statute of love is, we could answer that it is an anthropological transcendental.

Love, in turn, makes evident the need to expand the transcendental of unity so that it takes in plurality, in order to be able to explain love, which requires several persons, two at least. Polo admits that the ontological expansion he proposes affects above all the transcendental of unity, an issue not yet solved by any philosophy. In his view unity cannot be monolithic –what anthropologically leads to loneliness or individualism–, or the whole –which leads to pantheism or collectivism. On the contrary, it must take into consideration the difference, which makes it possible to explain interpersonal love and the union (co-being) that love enables.⁷³ Consequently, Polo's anthropology could serve as a basis to explain the 'unity of the two' that Karol Wojtyla talked about, which in itself is more than any of them separately, even though it is not a different person, as in God.

5. OPENNESS TO THE TRANSCENDENCE

Love opens us up to God's transcendence, this is a common conclusion of our two authors, to which they arrive reflecting on Creation, but with different nuances.

Polo reaches this conclusion through filiation, that he refers *in recto* (*directly*) to divine filiation, and this based upon a philosophical conviction, since if the person is a unique and unrepeatable act of being, that donation comes directly from God. With his words: "Human fatherhood is not the primary one, but God's creative fatherhood. According to that fatherhood, the first man is fundamentally son, as can be seen in Jesus' genealogy according to Luke, which finishes in Adam, who springs from God (Luke 3:34). Man's fatherhood, in its highest sense, is attributable to God. This obviously implies that man is not entirely son of his parents, or not in all his dimensions. The spiritual character itself

⁷³ Cf. L. POLO, Planteamiento de la antropología trascendental in Escritos menores (2001-2014), Obras Completas, vol. XXVI, pp. 51-59.

of every man does not come from his human parents but from God." 74

When Polo observes that the person, the act of being that makes the nature subsist transmitted by parents, is a gift from God, he indicates that, whenever a new man is conceived, the mystery of Creation is renewed. Creation is regarded as love from God towards the new being that comes into existence. He reached that conclusion when mentally examining the mathematical and physical improbability of the conception of each one of us. After considering how unlikely the occurrence was of the day and hour when the parents of anyone transmitted to him the nature, he concluded: "if I am it is because God has loved me." In a nutshell, filiation with regards to the Creator, as a manifestation of God's love to any new creature, is a form of openness to transcendence, frequently explored by Polo.

For Wojtyla, the highlight that evidences God's presence in the human being is his fulfillment of the *imago Dei* as the 'unity of the two.' Let us recall his words: "Man -states Wojtyla- becomes the image of God not so much in the moment of loneliness as in the moment of communion. Right 'from the beginning,' he is not only an image in which the solitude of a person who rules the world is reflected, but also, and essentially, an image of an inscrutable divine communion of persons."⁷⁵ Thus the 'unity of the two' becomes an image of the unity in the divine triad.⁷⁶

That image –not just in one, but in two who live 'for' each other, where both have become a gift and a welcome of the other–, that fullness of the image in man, represents the greatest openness of a human being to transcendence.

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⁷⁵ JOHN PAUL II, Theology of the Body, audience on 14.XI.1979, p. 25.

⁷⁶ Cf. JOHN PAUL II, Apostolic Letter Mulieris Dignitatem, 1988, n. 7.

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