

Journal of

ISSN: 2375-7329

Nº 1 / 2014

Polian



Studies

PRESENTATION

Ignacio Flagueras (University of Malaga)

TRANSLATION

Friendship in Aristotle (Miguel Martí & Philip Muller)

ARTICLES

Marga Vega (University of California)

What is the Mark of the Mental: Polo's Retrieval of Aristotle's *Energeia*

Juan Fernando Sellés (University of Navarra)

The Anthropological Foundation of Ethics and its Dualities

José Ignacio Murillo (University of Navarra)

Leonardo Polo and the Mind-Body Problem

Idoya Zorroza (University of Navarra)

Justice and Dominion in Light of Transcendental Anthropology

Blanca Castilla (Complutense University of Madrid)

Transcendental Anthropology and Foundation of Human Dignity

Daniel Castañeda (Panamerican University)

Requirements for the Study of Time and Action in Polo's Notion of Law

Aliza Racelis (University of the Philippines)

The Leader as Friend in Polo and Aristotle

CONFERENCES & NOTES

Juan A. García González (University of Malaga)

The Personal Being in Leonardo Polo's Philosophy

Gustavo González Couture (University of Los Andes)

A Brief Introduction to Polo's Ethics

REVIEWS & NEWS

Journal of Polian Studies



ANNUAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY SPONSORED BY
THE LEONARDO POLO INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY

Printed ISSN: 2375-7329
FOUNDED IN 2014
VOLUME I December 2014

www.leonardopoloinstitute.org/journal-of-polian-studies.html

EDITORIAL BOARD

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF:

Alberto I. Vargas

ASSISTANT EDITOR:

Gonzalo Alonso Bastarache

CONSULTING EDITORS:

Roderick Esclanda

Gregory L. Chafuen

Mark Mannion

COLLABORATORS

Robert DeSimone

Marial Corona

SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY BOARD

Adrian Reimers

UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME (USA)

Alex Chafuen

ATLAS NETWORK (USA)

Roderick J. Macdonald

UNIVERSITÉ DU QUÉBEC À MONTREAL
(Canada)

Alice Ramos

ST JOHN'S UNIVERSITY (USA)

Juan Arana

UNIVERSITY OF SEVILLA (Spain)

Juan A. García González

UNIVERSITY OF MALAGA (Spain)

Consuelo Martínez-Priego

PANAMERICAN UNIVERSITY (Mexico)

Jon Lecanda

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY (USA)

Elena Colombetti

UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO
CUORE (Italy)

Ángel Luis González

UNIVERSITY OF NAVARRA (Spain)

Daniel B. van Schalkwijk

AMSTERDAM UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE (Netherlands)

Martin Schlag

PONTIFICAL UNIVERSITY OF THE
HOLY CROSS (Italy)

Antoine Suarez

CENTER FOR QUANTUM
PHILOSOPHY (Switzerland)

Aliza Racelis

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
(Philippines)

Juan Fernando Sellés

UNIVERSITY OF NAVARRA (Spain)

Maciej Dybowski

ADAM MICKIEWICZ UNIVERSITY
(Poland)

PUBLISHER

Leonardo Polo Institute of Philosophy
1121 North Notre Dame Ave.
South Bend IN 46617
www.leonardopoloinstitute.org

SUBSCRIPTIONS

1 Issue..... 15 USD
3 years subscription... 40 USD

COVER DESIGN AND LAYOUT

Carlos Martí Fraga
Gonzalo Alonso Bastarache

The Publisher, Leonardo Polo Institute of Philosophy, and Editors cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this journal; the ideas, views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Publisher and Editors.

CONTENTS

Ignacio Falgueras

Presentation 7

TRANSLATION 9

Leonardo Polo

Friendship in Aristotle 11

ARTICLES 23

Marga Vega

What Is the Mark of the Mental: Leonardo Polo's Retrieval
 of Aristotle's *Energeia* 25

Juan Fernando Sellés

The Anthropological Foundation of Ethics
 and its Dualities 47

José Ignacio Murillo

Leonardo Polo and the Mind-Body Problem 79

Idoya Zorroza

Justice and Dominion in Light of Transcendental
 Anthropology 93

Blanca Castilla de Cortázar

Transcendental Anthropology and the Foundation of
 Human Dignity 105

Daniel Castañeda

Requirements for the Study of Time and Action
 in Polo's Notion of Law... and in Jurisprudence 121

Aliza Racelis

The Leader as Friend: Implications of Polo's *Friendship*
in Aristotle for Humanistic Corporate Governance 163

<i>CONFERENCES & NOTES</i>	197
Juan A. García González The Personal Being in Leonardo Polo's Philosophy	199
Gustavo González Couture A Brief Introduction to Polo's Ethics	215
<i>REVIEWS & NEWS</i>	227
<i>INSTRUCTIONS FOR AUTHORS</i>	253

The Leader as Friend: Implications of Polo's Friendship in Aristotle for Humanistic Corporate Governance

Aliza Racelis

University of the Philippines
aliza.racelis@up.edu.ph

RECEIVED: September 20, 2014

ACCEPTED: October 31, 2014

DEFINITIVE VERSION: November 17, 2014

ABSTRACT: This paper endeavors to show that Polo's essay on Aristotle's notions of *friendship* in his *Amistad en Aristóteles* has important implications for humanistic corporate governance, in particular through Polo's discernment of the nature and virtues of friendship as they may relate to leadership. Concretely, one can draw those virtues that are natural to him as a human being and as an authentic friend, which at the same time accompany his *transcendental leadership* of self-gift and service to others. Firstly, there are the chief moral virtues—or the cardinal virtues—of: (1) prudence, (2) justice, (3) fortitude, (4) temperance. In addition, there are the virtues of: (5) humility, (6) veracity, and (7) love, or charity. It is hoped that, by highlighting these characteristics of a *true friend* contained in *Amistad en Aristóteles*—especially the superiority of Christian charity over the *natural friendship* notions of Aristotle—we have provided clear indications for how the authentic *friend-leader* turns out to be the ideal moral leader who will bring about that much-desired *human flourishing* in organizational members and, by extension, successful business outcomes. The assertion here is that “transcendental leadership”, i.e., leadership by way of transcendent motives (in addition to extrinsic and intrinsic motives), whereby the leader makes himself have a genuine interest in the development of and in contributing to the good of the follower, has tremendous potential for a better organizational functioning..

KEYWORDS: Leader, Friendship, Governance, Aristotle, Polo, Pérez López, Corporate, Cardinal Virtues, Business

1. INTRODUCTION

Among the many social institutions around us, there is one that has come to take on a major importance: the business organization. We all know that resource allocation lies at the foundation of the economy; and businesses ought to employ goods and capabilities, in such a way that human beings in them improve and develop. But this is a function of good leadership, that is to say, of moral and ethical leadership, one that is able to question some of the basic assumptions about the way businesses are managed, one that is able to face the moral and ethical questions of daily decision-making, in order to ensure human capital development¹. This in turn is a function of who the leader is: whether he is one who can steer the organization to safe port, one who recognizes that the problems in the workplace today are fundamentally ethical problems, and that the task of management is not simply to make people feel better, but to create new moral relationships among the human persons in the organization².

Without a doubt, management at the beginning of the 21st century has come to be characterized by much complexity. Nevertheless, if we are able to count on *authentic men*, characteristically firm, with a strong sense of belongingness and a real desire for collaborative work, the business organization is greatly simplified. The focus on the manager is of the essence, since government is chiefly the formation in the governed of a character that makes possible the obtention of desired results without any need for coercion. But this, in turn, requires the molding of the executive in such a way that he is exemplary and encouraging: it requires of the manager a personal relationship with the governed in such a way that the pursuit of good ends is facilitated in a good manner³. Aristotle's treatment of *friends* and *friendship* can inform the subject matter of *leadership* a great deal: if the organizational leader were a *true* friend, that is, one who truly loves his co-workers and exercises charity, one who is truly concerned for the

¹ Cfr. TREVIÑO, L.K., HARTMAN, L.P., AND BROWN, M.; "Moral person and moral manager: How executives develop a reputation for ethical leadership". *California Management Review*. 42(4) 2000: 128-142; POLO, L.; *Quién es el Hombre Un espíritu en el tiempo*. Ed. cit..

² Cfr. CIULLA, J.; On Getting to the Future First. *Business Ethics Quarterly*. 10(1) 2000: 53-61.

³ Cfr. LLANO, C.; "Caracterología del directivo al inicio del Siglo XXI" *Revista Empresa y Humanismo*. 5(2/02) 2002: 321-344..

good of the person of the follower, then he would govern well. Polo's transcendental anthropology —especially his ruminations on Aristotle's notions of *friendship* as being filled with love and self-giving— sheds light on which character traits the leader ought to possess, in order to be of greater service to the human person and, by extension, to society at large⁴.

As management theory and practice face unprecedented challenges, especially in the aftermath of the recent global financial crisis, debates have surged wherein a re-investigation of human behavior and human character has been called for⁵. A deeper reflection on the causes of the current crisis indicates that they include not only techno-economic aspects, but also behavioral, moral, and cultural aspects, all of which are closely interrelated⁶. An existential reality is that *values* constantly motivate and guide persons' decision-making and, hence, there is need to acquire those values for good organizational functioning in whatever manner people normally form them: by study and reflection, by imitation or through the example of others, etc.⁷. It is in this sense that Polo⁸ asserted that business organizations will be able to resolve contemporary problems if they had the basic convictions, necessary for their good functioning. In principle, the businessman can and should perform this role, but many times he does not. He fails in these basic convictions if there is lack of ethics in his decision-making and appreciation of what business organizations ought to be doing for their future sustainability.

Recent leadership literature has found commonalities between leadership and friendship, for instance, Romero-Iribas and Martínez-Priego⁹ find that friendship and leadership share some defining elements and that education for friendship is an added value in leader-

⁴ Cfr. POLO, L.; La amistad en Aristóteles. *Anuario Filosófico*. 32:1999 477-485.

⁵ Cfr. MARSHALL, A., BADEN, D. AND GUIDI, M.; "Can an Ethical Revival of Prudence Within Prudential Regulation Tackle Corporate Psychopathy?" *Journal of Business Ethics*, 117 2013: 559-568.

⁶ Cfr. ARGANDOÑA, A.; MELÉ, D.; & SANCHEZ-RUNDE, C.; "Facing the Crisis: Toward a New Humanistic Synthesis for Business" *Journal of Business Ethics*. 2011 99:1-4.

⁷ Cfr. ARGANDOÑA, A.; Algunas tesis para un debate sobre los valores. *Revista Empresa y Humanismo*, 3(1/01) 2001: 45-74.

⁸ Cfr. POLO, L.; "Ética, virtudes, empresa". *Atlántida Madrid*. 14 (1993): 80-92.

⁹ Cfr. ROMERO-IRIBAS, A.M. AND MARTÍNEZ-PRIEGO, C.; "Developing leadership through education for friendship" *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences*. 15 2011: 2248-2252.

ship training. It is high time studies are added to leadership literature whereby attention is paid to the *consideration* or *warmth* dimension of leadership¹⁰, that is to say, leaders' ability to show concern for feelings of subordinates, referred to by Pérez López¹¹ as *affective* needs, those that relate to achieving satisfactory relationships with other people and are associated with the need to establish that we mean something to others and are liked as people. Friendship literature would fulfill such a task, and this paper takes up such a challenge.

2. NOTIONS OF FRIENDSHIP (IN EARLY WRITERS)

Philosophical interest in friendship has revived after a long eclipse. This is largely due to a renewed interest in ancient moral philosophy, in the role of emotion in morality, and in the ethical dimensions of personal relations in general. As is well known, the pre-Socratics—Empedocles, for example—understood friendship from a cosmological perspective, that is, as the engine that links the various elements of the universe. But it was the great Socratics who dealt with such perfection in man. After the misgivings of Plato in relation to what or who truly is a friend, the great Greek thinkers bequeathed to us a couple of maxims that were to be repeated subsequently: that friendship is mutual (requires reciprocity), that friendship can only be had between two *good* human beings; etc. Some of the main questions raised by philosophers are the following: Is friendship only an instrumental value, i.e., only a means to other values, or also an intrinsic value - a value in its own right? Is friendship a mark of psychological and moral self-sufficiency, or of deficiency? How does friendship-love differ from the unconditional love of *agape*, and how—if at all—is it related to justice? Can the particularist, partialist perspective of friendship be reconciled with the universalist, impartialist perspective of morality? Is friendship morally neutral, or does friendship at its best require a good character? Ancient moral philosophy devoted considerable attention to understanding friendship (*philia*) and passionate love (*eros*). In its widest sense, *philia* covers both amicable relations among

¹⁰ Cfr. LEE, T.L. AND FISKE, S.T.; "Social Cognitive Perspectives on Leadership". In Ciulla, Joanne [Ed.]. *Leadership at the Crossroads: Vol. 1, Leadership and Psychology*. Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2008.

¹¹ Cfr. PÉREZ LÓPEZ, J.A.; *Fundamentos de la dirección de empresas*, Madrid: Rialp, 1993.

casual acquaintances, and intimate, loving relationships within and without the family¹².

These themes were further clarified by Aristotle in his *Ethics*, along with a basic characteristic of such human good, namely, that friendship is in itself a virtue; but not just any virtue, rather a virtue that is superior to any other, including justice itself. Other characteristics attributed by Aristotle to friendship are: equality or similarity between friends; the limitedness of one's number of friends; the human friend's need for *living with* others; their common possession of goods, of joys and, above all, sufferings; permanence and effort; growth in friendly qualities; mutual correction between/among friends, etc. Aristotle likewise expresses rejection of characteristics not proper to friends, such as relations for mere pleasure, passion, interest in mere useful goods, honors, riches and other similar things, all of which are beneath what is proper to the human person. Aristotle had, thus, added an important characteristic essential to friendship: its *necessary* character—which has to be understood well, because otherwise we would misunderstand the important connection between friendship and personal human freedom, and thus we might consider this virtue as requisite instead of as superabundance¹³.

After Aristotle, the sharpest work on friendship in classic thinking is that by Cicero. Cicero's (106-43 BC) *De Amicitia* is largely responsible for transmitting Aristotle's conception of friendship to Christian philosophers, notably St Augustine (354-430) and Aelred of Rievaulx (1109-1166). Cicero builds on Aristotle's account, but with distinctive emphases. Thus, the internal component of self-sufficiency—a sense of security and self-confidence—is stressed as a necessary condition of friendship, and the centrality of mutual respect in perfect friendship, only implicit in Aristotle, is made explicit. Further, rationality is emphasized by the admonition to base friendship on careful observation and occasional testing of a person's character, and continual self-scrutiny. In addition, Cicero's account highlights friendship's nature as free and characteristic of *self-gift*: both words—*amor* and *amicitia*

¹² Cfr. BADHWAR, NEERA K.; "Introduction: The Nature and Significance of Friendship" In Neera K. Badhwar (Ed.), *Friendship: A Philosophical Reader*. New York: Cornell University Press 1993; PRICE, A.W.; *Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989.

¹³ Cfr. BADWAHR, *Ibid.*; SELLÉS, J. F.; *Precisiones sobre el método de estudio, la realidad, y la educación de la amistad*.

derive from *amare*, to love. And loving, for its part, is no other than distinguishing through affection the person that one loves, without being *forced* to do it out of necessity. He describes it with a definition which St. Augustine was to later on take up: "Friendship is nothing else than entire fellow feeling as to all things human and divine with mutual good-will and affection..." The noble Roman consul also offered excellent novelties in his discussions of the notion of friendship: its openness to the future, its permanence even after death, its superiority over parental or familial friendships, its requirement of veracity or truthfulness, its subordination to what is objectively just and honest, and above all, its foundation in *fidelity*¹⁴.

Other thinkers of the Roman age who made reference to friendship were Plutarch, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Diogenes Laertius, etc. who were, for the most part, authors writing from the stoic perspective, who preferred to distinguish between various forms and levels of friendship, likening it at times to cosmopolitan philanthropy, and asserting that only the wise can be friends in the proper sense. Among these writers' more fortunate articulations of this virtue are: that friendship is "a community of life", that the friend is "another self", "another equal"¹⁵.

3. FRIENDSHIP IN ARISTOTLE AS DISCERNED BY POLO

The transcendental anthropology of Leonardo Polo proposes four "anthropological transcendentals", namely: (1) Personal Co-existence, (2) Personal Freedom, (3) Personal Intellect or Knowing, and (4) Transcendental Love (Self-Gift) (Sellés, 2013). The human personal love refers to the superabundant and effusive love which lacks nothing, and hence, gives of itself. This personal loving takes on three dimensions, that are hierarchically distinct among them in every man, which are (in the order of superiority): (1) acceptance, (2) giving, and (3) gift. Each human person is in the first place an accepting with respect to God; and, in second place, is a giving, that is to say, a loving giving of oneself with respect to the Creator and to oth-

¹⁴ Cfr. *Ibidem*.

¹⁵ Cfr. SELLÉS; *op. cit.*

ers; and then, in third place, the person is a gift, a loving gift with respect to them¹⁶.

In *Amistad en Aristóteles*, Polo accepts Aristotle's assertions that "friendship...*is a kind of virtue or at least accompanies virtue*" and that "without friends, no one would ever want to live, even if he were to possess all other goods, for then he would be deprived of the possibility of doing good to another."¹⁷ A lot can therefore be learned from Aristotle's treatment of the human person, especially his notions of *friendship*. The view that the best kind of friendship, the friendship in which people love each other as the persons they are, is intrinsically moral is well expressed by Aristotle when he declares that friendship either *is* a virtue, or *involves* virtue¹⁸, and apparently endorses the "common belief" that "it is the same people that are good men and are friends"¹⁹. Thus, virtue is best exercised in pleasurable and beneficial activities with and towards friends, so it is virtuous people who most *want* friends²⁰.

We likewise know that the central case of friendship is *a relationship of reciprocal affection between two equal and similar adults, who have affection for each other because each recognizes and enjoys the virtues of the other*²¹. In addition, Polo²² emphasizes his view that, in friendship, the *good* as an *end* is the human person himself, and that friendship requires reciprocity, which brings along with it a *co-relation* of freedoms, that is to say, a friend always watches out for the good of the friend, his "other self". Nevertheless, the main distinction Polo makes is the superiority of Christian love (in Christian friendships), over and above the mere natural friendship in Aristotle.

It is this distinction that Polo²³ makes —the superiority of Christian love (in Christian friendships)— which this paper wishes to highlight to argue that the Christian love of an authentic friendship

¹⁶ Cfr. POLO, L. & LLANO, C.; *Antropología de la acción directiva*. Madrid: Unión Editorial, 1997.

¹⁷ POLO, L.; La amistad en Aristóteles. *Anuario Filosófico*. 32: 1999 477-485.

¹⁸ *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1155a1-2.

¹⁹ *Ibid*, 1155a29-31.

²⁰ Cfr. BADWAHR; *op. cit*.

²¹ Cfr. PAKALUK, M. *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.

²² Cfr. POLO, L.; La amistad en Aristóteles. *Anuario Filosófico*. 32: 1999 477-485.

²³ Cfr. *Ibid*.

can augur well for leadership and governance because, in such a friendship, one considers both a friend's actual and perceived good²⁴, and one truly loves his co-workers and exercises Christian charity. Precisely "the virtue of a friend consists in loving [*querer*]. For this reason flatterers are not true friends nor those who seek their own profit"²⁵. Thus, if the organizational leader were a *true* friend in the Polian sense, that is, one who exercises *transcendental leadership* through the possession of *transcendent* motives —referring to a genuine interest in the development and motives of the other person that goes beyond considering exclusively future effectiveness—, then better organizational functioning (in the sense of effective, efficient, and consistent) can be expected²⁶.

4. CAN A FRIENDLY LEADER CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE HUMANISTIC GOVERNANCE?

When crises hit —such as that which we continue reeling from, as a result of the recent financial crisis of 2007-08—, within the business organization one feels the need to open himself up not just to the two fields of human knowledge with which one is familiar —economics and sociology— but rather one will have to go much deeper: to the depths of the human person himself, that is, anthropology²⁷.

A deeper reflection on the causes of the current crisis indicates that they include not only techno-economic aspects, but also behavioral, moral, and cultural aspects. We should not overlook the personal decisions related with corporate strategies and business policy, including strong incentives associated with short-term profits, and mortgage-backed securities trading involving a manifest lack of transparency. It seems that this morass arose not only through insufficient and inadequate structures but also because of faulty human behavior and moral character. It appears that prudence and ethics were pushed aside as greed overcame good judgment among mort-

²⁴ Cfr. ELDER, A.; Why Bad People Can't be Good Friends. *Ratio*. 27 2013: 84-99..

²⁵ POLO, L.; La amistad en Aristóteles. *Anuario Filosófico*. 32: 1999 477-485., p. 480

²⁶ Cfr. PÉREZ LÓPEZ, J.A.; *Fundamentos de la dirección de empresas*, Madrid: Rialp, 1993.

²⁷ Cfr. LLANO, C.; "Caracterología del directivo al inicio del Siglo XXI" *Revista Empresa y Humanismo*. 5(2/02) 2002: 321-344.

gage lenders nationwide. Of course we can find large-scale failure of regulation and government policy in the advent of the crisis, but also negligence and greed on the part of the different actors empowered in the process²⁸.

Critics of the currently predominant management practices point out that national and individual bankruptcy has gone hand in hand with excessive enrichment of the few which seems to be a result of a highly short-term view of business as well as a manifestation of a pessimistic conception of human beings as merely economic agents, neglecting other dimensions fundamental to good management²⁹. The improvement in the governance of firms will, thus, consist not so much in perfecting models of regulation as in a new notion of the function of the firm and in a better articulation of the organs of governance within firms, most especially the governing board and with a special focus on the chief executive³⁰.

But what should be the role and end of the chief executive? We have it from Polo himself who affirms that the human person is an *open system* and, as such, is capable of learning, but a learning that is positive (if he is to be truly human) and is made most perfectly positive through the cultivation of the virtues³¹. Applied to the managerial context, a fully human manager would be one who ensures the positive learning in the follower and the formation of his character through the virtues. We glean the transcendent nature of such managerial function from the *Theory of Human Action in Organizations* whereby Pérez López³² explains that the human person in business organizations is capable of having *transcendent motives*, which are aspects of reality that determine the achievement of learning from other people with whom the decision-maker interacts. Rosanas and

²⁸ Cfr. ARGANDOÑA, MELÉ AND SANCHEZ-RUNDE, *op. cit.*

²⁹ Cfr. ANDREU, R. AND ROSANAS, J.M.; Manifesto for a Better Management: A Rational and Humanistic View. In Ricart, J.E. and Rosanas, J.M. [Eds.], *Towards a New Theory of the Firm: Humanizing the Firm and the Management Profession*. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA, 2012.

³⁰ Cfr. CANALS, J.; La mejora del gobierno corporativo: algunas reflexiones desde la crisis financiera. *Revista de Contabilidad y Dirección*. 10 2010: 11-33.

³¹ Cfr. POLO, L.; *Ética: Hacia una versión moderna de los clásicos*. Madrid: Aedos, Unión Editorial, 1997; POLO, L.; *Quién es el Hombre Un espíritu en el tiempo*. Ed. cit..

³² Cfr. PÉREZ LÓPEZ, J.A.; *Teoría de la acción humana en las organizaciones: La acción personal*. Ed. cit..

Velilla³³ explain this quite well by saying that the *ethical* (read “morally good”) manager is, thus, one who provides the motivational conditions for the organizational members to achieve their full potential which, in Polian terms, ultimately means being that free and open system who is capable of self-gift, that radical love (a selfless interest in the good of the other) proposed by Polo as a radical *anthropological transcendental*.

All this is, thus, pointing to a more *humanistic* approach to business and management, which could be called humanistic when its outlook emphasizes common human needs and is oriented to the development of human virtue, in all its forms, to its fullest extent. This human-centered approach factors in the complexity of human nature and emphasizes the human being and its will to protect the species in the long term. This kind of management appears to achieve a higher moral quality³⁴. Polo’s transcendental anthropology—especially his ruminations on Aristotle’s notions of *friendship* as being filled with love and self-giving—can, thus, shed light on which characteristics the leader—who is at the same time a true friend—can contribute to bringing about a better governance of firms through greater service to the human person and, by extension, to society at large. After all, the businessman is the one who knows how to give; he is not the one intent on making money, but the one who allocates money to carry out a project that offers new and better possibilities to society³⁵.

5. FROM TRANSFORMATIONAL TO *TRANSCENDENTAL* LEADERSHIP

Leadership from the start of the 20th Century—especially with the burgeoning of management science literature—has been studied from various perspectives and utilizing the most varied methodologies, resulting in the appearance of thousands of publications and

³³ Cfr. ROSANAS, J. M. AND VELILLA, M.; “Loyalty and Trust as the Ethical Bases of Organizations”. *Journal of Business Ethics*. 44 2003: 49-59.

³⁴ Cfr. MELÉ, D.; The challenge of humanistic management. *Journal of Business Ethics*. 44 2003, 77-88; PIRSON, M. AND VON KIMAKOWITZ, E.; “Towards a Human-Centered Theory and Practice of the Firm: Presenting the Humanistic Paradigm of Business and Management” *Journal of Management for Global Sustainability*. Vol. 2, 2014.

³⁵ Cfr. SELLÉS, J.F.; *Antropología para inconformes, una antropología abierta al futuro*. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 2007.

studies. Major topics and controversies include leadership versus management, leader traits and skills, leader behavior and activities, leader power and influence, situational determinants of leader behavior, situational moderator variables, transformational leadership, importance of leadership for organizational effectiveness, and leadership as an attributional process. Indeed, as shown by works reviewing the extensive leadership literature, there seems to be no consensus among academics with respect to what a leader is and how he must exercise leadership³⁶. The most advanced approaches among the more recent studies are those on “transformational leadership” and on “servant leadership”. Upon further investigation, the proposals of Polo³⁷, of Polo and Llano³⁸ and of Pérez López³⁹ have offered rather insightful theories from an anthropological perspective, which in turn have led scores of scholars to apply their thoughts to contemporary management issues.

Pérez López⁴⁰ had proposed three main activities that managers must carry out, adding *leadership capacity* to the already extant *strategic capacity* and *executive capacity*. *Leadership capacity* in the thought of Pérez López has to do with what he calls *transcendent motives* (different from the *extrinsic* and *intrinsic* motives already extant in the literature) which refer to a genuine interest in the development and motives of the other person that goes beyond considering exclusively future effectiveness. These refer to the importance that each person gives to the influence that one’s actions and decisions can exert on other people, that is to say, the *transcendent motives* reflect the value given to the repercussions of one’s decisions on others⁴¹. In turn, such *transcendent motives* at work in a leader bring about a *transcendental leadership* defined by a relationship of *personal influence*, in which interactions take place through extrinsic, intrinsic, as well as transcendent motives. Thus, a transcendental

³⁶ Cfr. VÉLAZ, I. AND PASTORIZA, D.; “Business as a Vocation: The Business Leadership as a Vocation” *Paper presented at the Fifth International Symposium on Catholic Social Thought and Management Education*. Bilbao, Spain, 2003; YUKL, G.; Managerial Leadership: A Review of Theory and Research. *Journal of Management*. 15(2) 1999: 251-289.

³⁷ Cfr. POLO, L.; “Ética, virtudes, empresa”. *Atlántida Madrid*. 14 (1993): 80-92.

³⁸ Cfr. *op. cit.*

³⁹ Cfr. PÉREZ LÓPEZ, J.A.; *Fundamentos de la dirección de empresas*, Madrid: Rialp, 1993.

⁴⁰ Cfr. *Ibíd.*

⁴¹ Cfr. VELAZ AND PASTORIZA; *op. cit.*

leadership goes beyond transformational leadership in that it is a relationship of influence between leaders and collaborators, that is to say, an *inter-influential* leadership, one that is *relational* on the basis of a special kind of motivation on the part of the leader to *contribute to the good of those he leads*⁴².

The *anthropology of organizations* of Pérez López also distinguishes among three levels of needs, the highest being *affective needs*, that is, needs related to achieving satisfactory relationships with other people and are associated with the need to establish that we mean something to others and are liked as people. This entails being safe in the knowledge that we are loved for what and who we are as opposed to being appreciated merely because we have certain qualities or the fact that we are useful. This obviously has implications for management, especially for a more *humanistic* governance. For instance, as Rosanas⁴³ explains, it has implications for leadership *effectiveness*: only a transcendental leadership can foster the unity and identification with the organization, as well as loyalty and trust in firms, which are so necessary for good organizational functioning.

This *transcendental* language was already present in the emerging thought of Polo, whereby the human person, being an “open and free system”, naturally tends towards self-gift, and his growth as a human being is a function of this. That is, on distinguishing clearly between *having* and *being*, he explains clearly that, if the human person were to merely reduce himself to *having* (power, for example, in the case of leadership), then he would alienate himself, he would sacrifice his nature to something outside of himself. Rather, his *having* should be given over to a love for and service to others, for this is the very essence of his personal being, which is free and *donat*⁴⁴.

In this regard, Polo⁴⁵ has been prophetic, on saying that economics, which attempts at every turn to arrive at the optimum resource allocation, has to subject itself to ethics, and has to focus on how to employ those goods and resources as well as human capabilities in

⁴² Cfr. CARDONA, P.; *Liderazgo relacional*. In Pérez López, J.A. et al. [Eds.] *Paradigmas de liderazgo*. Madrid: McGraw-Hill, 2001.

⁴³ Cfr. ROSANAS, J. M.; “Beyond Economic Criteria: A Humanistic Approach to Organizational Survival”. *Journal of Business Ethics*. 78 2008: 447–462.

⁴⁴ Cfr. POLO, L.; *Ética: Hacia una versión moderna de los clásicos*. Madrid: Aedos, Unión Editorial, 1997.

⁴⁵ Cfr. POLO, L.; *Quién es el Hombre Un espíritu en el tiempo*. Ed. cit..

accord with the alternatives available. To the economist belongs the task of looking for a resource allocation system through which aims can be attained; that is to say, there exists the possibility that objectives may be in conflict with one another, which in turn means that there must be the possible alternative by which *human beings can improve and grow*, which is an aim that is usually forgotten, but is quite urgent and necessary. In other words, it is not the economist that sets the objectives, but it is human beings that set them. There must be a way to synthesize the two differing approaches to politics, one that argues that the institutional framework within which business operates ought to be tested by theories of distributive justice, and the other, from virtue theory, which argues that we ought to examine the character of individual employees and the responsibilities associated with the roles which these individuals play within organizations⁴⁶.

The next section describes the virtues that can be said to be a natural goal of the good leader (goal for himself and goal for those he leads) since, as Llano⁴⁷ says, management in and of itself is formative of character (one's own and others') and the most valuable managerial dimension is precisely forming in those managed a character which makes possible the obtention of outcomes required of him, without the need for being pushed towards them. This characterology of executives thus becomes a central piece of leaders' task, in addition to the fact that they have to form their own character primordially through exemplariness, transmission or contagion. It is these conditions that the manager ought to facilitate, for the organizational members to hopefully achieve their full human potential. In the next section, too, the various virtues that seem to belong to the nature of a friend-leader will be derived from the Aristotelian notion of a friend as an "other self": it is the assertion of this paper that the exercise of these virtues by the friend-leader can ultimately lead toward a better organization.

⁴⁶ Cfr. MAGUIRE, S.; "Business Ethics: A compromise between Politics and Virtue" *Journal of Business Ethics*. 16(12/13) 1997: 1411-1418.

⁴⁷ Cfr. LLANO, C.; "Caracterología del directivo al inicio del Siglo XXI" *Revista Empresa y Humanismo*. 5(2/02) 2002: 321-344.

6. VIRTUES FLOWING FROM A FRIEND TO AN “OTHER SELF” IN A LEADERSHIP CONTEXT

Polo says: “Loyalty and justice are conditions for the coexistence of free systems. This brief allusion to the cardinal virtues is essential, the hinge virtues of which classical ethics speaks: prudence, justice, fortitude, temperance. But there is more: truthfulness, friendship, the most important of the virtues according to Aristotle. Friendship demands respect, mutual esteem. What friendship can there be without dialogue?”⁴⁸ Polo⁴⁹ likewise emphasizes that the human being, no matter what his journeys and difficulties, can always grow; he grows to the measure that his acts are good, which in turn depends on the growth of the dispositions for those acts. Such acts are the moral virtues. A virtue is the guarantee of the unrestricted character of human perfecting.

This section takes the Aristotelian notion of virtue as a *good habit by which we live righteously*. In the context of Aristotelian friendship, we focus on the phrase *we must pass on to a consideration of friendship, for it is a kind of virtue or at least accompanies virtue*⁵⁰. In addition, we take in Thomas Aquinas’ commentary “[the Philosopher] now turns his attention to friendship which is founded upon virtue as an effect of it” (Aquinas, 1964). In other words, we consider virtue in the sense in which Polo (1996) explained it: *at the superior level of humanness, man is capable of having (in an intrinsic manner) in his very nature an acquired perfection, and this is what the Greeks referred to as virtue or habit*.

Applied to the organizational ambit of the leader-friend, this section draws those virtues that are natural to him as a human being and as an authentic friend, which at the same time accompany his *transcendental leadership* of self-gift and service to others, that is, of the kind that is *relational* in such a way as to *contribute* to the *good* of those he leads. Firstly, there are the chief moral virtues—or the cardinal virtues—of prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance. Next there is the virtue of humility. Mention was made above that the transcendental leader, who leads by way of transcendent motives (in ad-

⁴⁸ Cfr. POLO, L.; *Ética: Hacia una versión moderna de los clásicos*. Madrid: Aedos, Unión Editorial, 1997, p. 116.

⁴⁹ Cfr. POLO, L.; *Quién es el Hombre Un espíritu en el tiempo*. Ed. cit..

⁵⁰ *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1155a.

dition to extrinsic and intrinsic motives), makes himself have a genuine interest in the development of and in contributing to the good of the follower, and thus, necessarily and preferentially seeks the personal development and attainment of the full potential of the others. And an indispensable condition is that this difficult task moves him to constantly transcend his egoism: and this is the virtue of *humility*⁵¹.

Another virtue that seems to belong to the nature of a friend as an “other self” is *veracity* in communication. Man is a social being because he is a dialogic being, that is, capable of expressing what he thinks to others and to establish thereby a communicative network ... The knowledge that man acquires through the use of reason would disappear if it were not to be deposited in some way in a tradition. It is also clear that, if a person thinks, but does not ever communicate with others, what he has thought dies with him⁵². But such communication must be truthfulness (to speak the truth and to act according to the truth); without truthfulness, there is no communication⁵³. Last but not least, we have the virtue of *love*, or *charity*. The earlier section above discussed the *anthropological transcendental*, in Polo’s transcendental anthropology, called transcendental love, a radical love which is a gift of self. Human personal love refers to the superabundant and effusive love which lacks nothing, and hence, gives of itself⁵⁴.

In *Amistad en Aristóteles*, Polo highlights, in Part II, the difference between Aristotelian friendship and *Christian* friendship, and shows the superiority of the latter: “Christian friendship differs from the pagan sense of friendship, which was exclusivist; one loved a friend and hated the enemy. Also, for Aristotle, friends are few. To this it should be added that Aristotle does not see how one can be a friend of God, because friendship is between equals”⁵⁵. This superiority of Christian love of Christian friendship will be discussed further

⁵¹ Cfr. LLANO, C.; *Humildad y liderazgo: ¿necesita el empresario ser humilde?* Naucalpan (Mexico): Ediciones Ruz 2004.

⁵² Cfr. POLO, L.; *Ética: Hacia una versión moderna de los clásicos*. Madrid: Aedos, Unión Editorial, 1997.

⁵³ Cfr. POLO, L.; “Ética, virtudes, empresa”. *Atlántida Madrid*. 14 (1993): 80-92.

⁵⁴ Cfr. SELLES, J.F.; *Los tres agentes del cambio en la sociedad civil: familia, universidad y empresa*. Pamplona: EIUNSA 2013.

⁵⁵ Cfr. POLO, L.; La amistad en Aristóteles. *Anuario Filosófico*. 32: 1999 477-485.; p. 483.

in a later section, but it is the assertion of this paper that the transcendental leadership of a person who is a true friend possessing Christian love has a greater potential for effecting a better organizational functioning, because of the further human development (cultivation of the full gamut of moral virtues) attained in the organizational members, both followers and leaders alike.

a) Prudence

No dictum strikes such a note of strangeness to the ears of contemporaries as this one: that the virtue of *prudence* is the mold and “mother” of all the cardinal virtues, of justice, fortitude, and temperance. In other words, none but the prudent man can be just, brave, and temperate, and the good man is good in so far as he is prudent⁵⁶. Polo⁵⁷ says that any man of action, and above all someone in government, is using it constantly: he practices prudence in the management of his affairs; otherwise, he would not be able to survive. Prudence is essential to government; it is (this is the way philosophers of classical times called it) *auriga virtutum*. It is the directive virtue. In his directing and governing, the mature person ought to be, with due information and with acquired habits, able to dominate what is novel, unexpected, or exceptional. Accumulated experience makes man capable of confronting the unexpected. Obviously, in practice it is quite difficult to avoid mistakes because we are not omniscient, but prudence allows us to rectify⁵⁸.

Prudence can be quite demanding⁵⁹: it asks that man exercise it in correction and in foreseeing the unforeseeable⁶⁰. Correction is an appeal to the friend's *synderesis*, the light of which is incompatible with grave errors, especially with regard to loving. In sum, correcting a friend is a manifestation of the elevation of prudence and of justice as virtues that accompany friendship. Prudence is the corrector of

⁵⁶ Cfr. PIEPER, J.; *The Four Cardinal Virtues*. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc, 1965.

⁵⁷ Cfr. POLO, L.; *Ética: Hacia una versión moderna de los clásicos*. Madrid: Aedos, Unión Editorial, 1997.

⁵⁸ Cfr. POLO, L. & LLANO, C.; *Antropología de la acción directiva*. Madrid: Unión Editorial, 1997.

⁵⁹ Cfr. POLO, L.; *Ética: Hacia una versión moderna de los clásicos*. Madrid: Aedos, Unión Editorial, 1997.

⁶⁰ Cfr. POLO, L.; *Quién es el Hombre Un espíritu en el tiempo*. ed. cit.

voluntary acts aimed at the means. For its part, the just correction has a penal character. In contrast, the friendly correction attempts to directly reestablish the purity of a friend's conduct⁶¹. To be prudent is virtuous for man, because he constantly faces problems. This aspect of prudence is called *solertia*. Solertia is to be willing and ready to face what is unforeseeable. All told, it is well for the leader to exert effort to be an authentic friend possessing these virtues, in particular the cardinal virtue of prudence, for this *practical wisdom* leads him to not only fulfill certain roles but rather to be concerned with growing with those roles, that is to say, a professional who grows and makes the others grow⁶².

b) Justice

Justice is indispensable for the good functioning of an organization, above all when this virtue is understood as distributive justice, that is, as a “meritocracy”: he is entrusted with the position or task who carries out the function best. On its part, justice is one of the superior virtues of the will, perhaps exceeded only by friendship: it consists in giving to each one what he merits to receive (Sellés, 2013). From the classic writers, we know that justice is a habit (*habitus*), whereby a man renders to each one his due with constant and perpetual will. But what, in fact, is each man's due? And above all, what is, generally speaking, the basis for a “*suum*”? How does anything come to belong to a person, anyway? ... Man, however, is a *person*—a spiritual being, a whole unto himself, a being that exists for itself and of itself, that wills its own proper perfection. Therefore, and for that very reason, something is due to man in the fullest sense, for that reason he does inalienably have a *suum*, a “right” which he can plead against everyone else, a right which imposes upon every one of his partners the obligation at least not to violate it. Indeed, man's personality—the constitution of his spiritual being by virtue of which he is master of his own actions— even requires (*requirit*), says Thomas, that Divine Providence guide the personality “for his own sake”⁶³.

⁶¹ Cfr. POLO, L.; La amistad en Aristóteles. *Anuario Filosófico*. 32: 1999, pp.477-485.

⁶² Cfr. POLO, L.; *Quién es el Hombre Un espíritu en el tiempo*. ed. cit.

⁶³ Cfr. PIEPER, J.; *op. cit.*, 1965.

At the start, it seems as if virtues were not necessary: it is not necessary to be just (to have acquired the stable habit of giving to each one that which is *his* (“*suum*”) in order to make a just decision for a specific situation. But in practice, without the exercise and learning of this virtue —developed only by dint of habitual exercise—, it would be very difficult for a person who is not just to realize, in a concrete situation, that precisely in that circumstance there exists a problem of justice: only with difficulty will he understand which is the just decision in those circumstances, and one has to have the courage and strength of will to put it into practice⁶⁴. Likewise, justice has a lot of implications for cooperation. The key to justice resides more in giving, i.e. in an act of the will, than in the thing given. Justice is “giving to each his due”, not necessarily accepting or donating. This explains how justice has been called the bond of social cohesion: Justice forms the basis of social relations⁶⁵.

c) Temperance & Sobriety

It has been helpful to think of the human person as an *open system*. As such, ethics can thus be understood as the science of the interconnection among free systems: the coming together of prudence, obedience and command/control. Along with this, we affirm the need for courage —for without it, the administrator will not be able to administer anything at all—, as well as temperance, because the intemperate will simply allow himself to be led by the waves. Virtues make us free: only the virtuous are masters of their acts. Aristotle devotes central passages of the *Ethics* to intemperance, saying that some intemperate people are able to cease being so, but that others seem to not cease being so because they never learn: and in this they are truly *slaves*⁶⁶.

According to Polo, it is good to always begin with temperance and with fortitude before educating the young in prudence and justice in

⁶⁴ Cfr. ARGANDOÑA, A.; “La ética en la empresa y la ética del directivo”, *Boletín de Estudios Económicos*. 69 (211) 2014: 9-23.

⁶⁵ Cfr. SELLÉS, J.F.; *Antropología para inconformes, una antropología abierta al futuro*. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 2007.

⁶⁶ Cfr. POLO, L.; *Ética: Hacia una versión moderna de los clásicos*. Madrid: Aedos, Unión Editorial, 1997.

which it is all right to instruct them at a much later time⁶⁷. Lifestyles should be inspired by sobriety, temperance, and self-discipline at both the individual and social levels. There is a need to break with the logic of mere consumption. These attitudes, sustained by a renewed awareness of the interdependence of all the inhabitants of the earth, will contribute to eliminating the numerous causes of the world's disasters⁶⁸.

It is clear that, in order to be strong, one has to be temperate. He who loses temperance loses courage. Temperance contemplates human motivations, human desires; what is characteristic of desire is that it be directed to satisfaction. Native desire procures immediate satisfaction: desires cannot wait. Thus, if one does not control one's desire, one cannot be courageous, one is unable to adopt an attitude towards arduous things. The courageous ones postpone satisfaction. He who confronts what is arduous precisely confronts what is directly not satisfactory. Desires can be satisfied immediately, they are of little worth. Thus, the man who gives in to the functional rule of desires loses something more important: his happiness. Thus, the hedonist is not a happy being. In sum, temperance is the virtue that controls one's sensible desires in accord with human knowledge, which is not exclusively sensible. He who does not control his desires cannot govern well (humanly) an organization or business, for he who is unable to control it, more than being a contributor, he becomes a consumer, a taker: and this is not only opposed to the very nature and mission of an economic entity, but contrary as well to the nature of a person⁶⁹.

d) Fortitude or Courage

When man looks upon his work as part of the circumstances of ordinary everyday life and does not at all desire to cease being the person who carries out the work, in whom there reigns the *solidity of a mature interior life*, then there will come to the fore a gamut of

⁶⁷ Cfr. SELLÉS, J.F.; *Los tres agentes del cambio en la sociedad civil: familia, universidad y empresa*. Pamplona: EIUNSA 2013.

⁶⁸ Cfr. PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE; *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church*, 2004, no. 486.

⁶⁹ Cfr. SELLÉS, J.F.; *Los tres agentes del cambio en la sociedad civil: familia, universidad y empresa*. Pamplona: EIUNSA 2013.

virtues: fortitude to persevere, temperance to overcome comfort, justice in order to fulfill one's duties toward God, society, the family, colleagues, and prudence in order to know what is good to do and do it without hesitation⁷⁰. Fortitude is practiced, in the context of the business organization, by way of constantly pursuing those grand long-term ideals, that is to say, when one is in search of goods that are arduous, difficult and hardly accessible. Of course, for this there should be strong motives. He is strong who, in the face of problems, responds with self-correction, with a reasonable attack, and who puts up a patient or serene countering between reality and his capabilities. But in order to resist evil, there is no other way but to deepen in one's principles. He who lacks such profound convictions is unable to resist evil. In the face of evil, the task at hand is to resist. Such serenity entails suffering, obviously: a stark reality which is a law of life and from which no one is immune. All told, the courageous one is the one who lives it, more than the fanatic or the cynic. Fortitude is shown more in resisting than in attacking. One ought not always to attack (as the fanatic thinks), neither to merely allow things to pass (as the cynic does)⁷¹.

In the context of the business organization, when work depends on people working for others, then collaboration is a necessity. If a person cannot do a job without counting on another, that other is a collaborator, even if he is a subordinate. In these cases, the leader necessarily delegates. For delegation to work, firstly there is need to uplift the level of the collaborators (without competent collaborators, the costs of coordination rise). Secondly, there is need to train workers (both despotism and paternalism are an insult to the intelligence of colleagues, in other words, to his nature as person). In both requirements, dialogue is needed. With communication, whoever commands learns, and is put in conditions of obeying those who offer the best solutions. Thus, *commanding and obeying are correlative*: only he who knows how to command learns how to obey, and vice versa. Communication has to have content: leadership requires being informed of the relevant factors. In addition, it is good to have the entire gamut of pieces of information and to study the compatibility

⁷⁰ Cfr. LLANO, CARLOS; *La amistad en la empresa*. México: IPADE-Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2001.

⁷¹ Cfr. SELLÉS, J.F.; *Los tres agentes del cambio en la sociedad civil: familia, universidad y empresa*. Pamplona: EIUNSA 2013.

among them. All this understandably necessitate fortitude or courage⁷².

e) Humility

Humility is a virtue that is particularly important for those who govern or manage, or who are vested with authority and power. The word *humility* comes from the Latin *humilitas*, which in turn comes from *humus*, the earth beneath us. It refers to something that is fundamental within the individual. Humility has an intrapersonal dimension, the vision that the agent has of himself, and an interpersonal or expressed dimension, how he reacts to how others see him and how he sees others. These are not independent dimensions: what characterizes the humble person is the self-knowledge he has of himself and, in particular, the intention with which he appraises or judges himself. Intention is important because, like all genuine virtues, humility is practiced for the agent's development or improvement, and for service to others. In recent years new theoretical and empirical approaches in psychology and in business ethics have dealt with humility not as a weakness but as a strength of the person, emphasizing its contribution to social cohesion and the creation of trust⁷³.

In the *friend-leader*, there are indispensable requirements, some of which are superior to others. One such superior prerequisite is the ability to know each person with long-term vision and accepting each person freely as a distinct individual with his own intimacy. Since the origin of such distinction is God himself, there exists true friendship only if one knows and accepts each intimate human being as a distinct creature of God. Therefore, affirming the Ambrosian doctrine, it is said that only he can be a *true friend* unto the depths of one's being who is a *friend of God*⁷⁴. And since hope, faithfulness, and humility are proper to a friend of God, then only a humble person can be a good leader, as opposed to one who is filled with *hubris* (exaggerated

⁷² Cfr. *Ibíd.*

⁷³ Cfr. ARGANDOÑA, A. (2014a). Humility in Management. *Journal of Business Ethics*. Forthcoming. 2014.

⁷⁴ Cfr. SELLÉS, *Precisiones sobre el método de estudio, la realidad, y la educación de la amistad*, [n.d.].

pride, self-confidence, or arrogance) which has been blamed for many resounding leadership failures⁷⁵.

f) Communicativeness and Veracity

For us to understand more fully the social dimensions of human living, we have to accept the reality that there exists in man a real distinction between a dimension which is the more important one—personal intimacy—and the external or *manifestative* dimension, which is dependent on the real. Man's social nature belongs to this latter: the *manifestative* relationship among the different classes of men belongs to what we nowadays call *intersubjectivity*. Since human manifestations can be positive or negative, that is, in favor of or contrary to the perfecting of the human *essence* (i.e., either virtuous or vicious), *intersubjectivity* can be either perfecting or degrading. Given that the human *essence* has been created to grow, each person is responsible for rectifying all intersubjective relationships that can inhibit such growth, and nourish those which enable such development. If the improvement in humankind (the perfection of the human *essence*) grows to the measure that men interact virtuously among one another, then we can conclude that a life that is both humanized and humanizing can only be had through *living together* (*convivencia*)⁷⁶.

Now, in that *living together*, truthfulness or veracity is a dimension of friendship, which links it to freedom. But one does not leave a friend alone if he commits mistakes, but rather one corrects him⁷⁷, with the necessary prudence, which has been discussed above. In this sense, friendship has a pedagogical value. In effect, the friend is “another self”. Sellés⁷⁸ adds that there is no mutual friendship without truth, but such truth is channeled through veracity or truthfulness, which consists in manifesting the truth, but as it is vivified by friend-

⁷⁵ Cfr. KROLL, M.J.; TOOMBS, L.A.; AND WRIGHT, P.; “Napoleon’s tragic march home from Moscow: Lessons in hubris”. *Academy of Management Executive*. 14(1) 2000: 117-128.

⁷⁶ Cfr. SELLÉS, J.F.; *Los tres agentes del cambio en la sociedad civil: familia, universidad y empresa*. Pamplona: EIUNSA 2013.

⁷⁷ Cfr. POLO, L.; La amistad en Aristóteles. *Anuario Filosófico*. 32:1999 477-485.

⁷⁸ Cfr. SELLÉS, J.F.; “Sin verdad no cabe verdadera amistad. Sin amistad no hay amor a la verdad” *Miscelánea Poliana*. Málaga: Instituto de Estudios Filosóficos Leonardo Polo 2012.

ship and charity which are both personal. And that manifestation ought to be done with humility. Thus we assert that, if the business leader is to be true to his nature as a human being with an essentially social nature and exercises the moral virtues of a perfect friend, then he will have to be instructed in the ways of a communicative, truthful and concerned leader.

Honesty and truth-telling are thus important virtues of the *friend-leader*. But what kind of truth? Science seeks the truth of things, whereas friendship seeks the truth of persons. Since persons are superior to things, one has to put the discovered truths about things at the service of the good of human beings, which in turn means that science ought to be placed at the service of friendship. Thus, we can also say that the truth has to be manifested in such a way as to reach friendship⁷⁹. Put another way, authentic leadership can be equated with truthful leadership. Evidence of the importance of honesty abounds in the business ethics literature: Almost every professional code that governs professional associations within the business sector requires its members to act with integrity, which is interpreted to mean honesty. Lying is a symptom of lack of integrity and does not quite get to the core meaning. It is well known that a disregard for honesty has had significant adverse results⁸⁰.

g) Self-gift (radical love), kindness, and magnanimity

In Polo's *transcendental anthropology*, four important anthropological transcendentals emerge, one of them being "personal love or loving". Human personal love refers to the superabundant and effusive love which lacks nothing, and hence, gives of itself. This personal loving takes on three dimensions, that are hierarchically distinct among them in every man, which are (in the order of superiority): (1) acceptance, (2) giving, and (3) gift. Each human person is in the first place an accepting with respect to God; and, in second place, is a giving, that is to say, a loving giving of oneself with respect to the Creator and to others; and then, in third place, the person is a gift, a loving

⁷⁹ Cfr. *Ibíd.*

⁸⁰ Cfr. BOATRIGHT, J.R.; *Finance Ethics: Critical Issues in Theory and Practice*. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc 2010.

gift with respect to them⁸¹. In Part II of *Amistad en Aristóteles*, Polo highlights the difference between Aristotelian friendship and *Christian* friendship, and shows the superiority of the latter: “Christian friendship differs from the pagan sense of friendship, which was exclusivist; one loved a friend and hated the enemy. Also, for Aristotle, friends are few. To this it should be added that Aristotle does not see how one can be a friend of God, because friendship is between equals”⁸².

Thus, Polo⁸³ affirms that what sets Christian friendship apart (from Aristotelian friendship) is its definition of a good God-fearing friend —“ No one can have greater love than to lay down his life for his friends.” (John 15: 13)— as somebody who gives of himself to such an extent as to lose himself for the sake of the (good of the) friend, his *other self*. Polo’s transcendental anthropology makes it clear that the human essence takes on a *donal* character (natural tendency to receive gifts at the same time to give of oneself): each person gives growth to his essence throughout his life, and it is obvious that the mature “I” is, even from an economic perspective, more fruitful. This fruitful maturity is seen, above all, in a generous and magnanimous soul⁸⁴. In business activity, the logic of gift includes two aspects. The first is considering the logic of gift as a new conceptual lens in order to view business relationship beyond contractual logic. In this view, it is crucial to see the circulation of goods as instrumental for the development of relationships. The second aspect is to qualify the relationships established through the gift, and to think about the motivation in gift-giving, which has an ethical content. We give because we have received, and through gift-giving we develop relationships that have a high ‘bonding value’⁸⁵.

⁸¹ Cfr. POLO, L. & LLANO, C.; *Antropología de la acción directiva*. Madrid: Unión Editorial, 1997.

⁸² Cfr. POLO, L.; La amistad en Aristóteles. *Anuario Filosófico*. 32: 1999 477-485, p. 483.

⁸³ Cfr. *Ibid.*

⁸⁴ Cfr. SELLÉS, J.F.; *Los tres agentes del cambio en la sociedad civil: familia, universidad y empresa*. Pamplona: EIUNSA 2013.

⁸⁵ Cfr. FALDETTA, G.; The Logic of Gift and Gratuitousness in Business Relationships. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 100 2011:67-77.

7. FRIENDLY LEADERSHIP PRODUCING WELL-GOVERNED ORGANIZATIONS

The task of a leader is chiefly one of governing men, and in order to be a good governor, one necessary —although not sufficient— condition is to be a good person⁸⁶. We have seen above that Polo⁸⁷ discerns the superiority of Christian friendship (by virtue of Christian love) over Aristotelian friendship: that we can allow for love towards enemies or man's friendship with God. Aquinas holds that, in Christian charity, the classical understanding of friendship has been perfected by grace⁸⁸. This being the case, it is necessary to assert that love is needed in business organizations. The traditional theories of the firm leave no room for love in business organizations, perhaps because it is thought that love is only an emotion or feeling, not a virtue, or because economic efficiency and profit making are considered to be incompatible with the practice of charity or love⁸⁹.

Transcendental leadership consists in learning to value the needs of other people and to respond even to their so-called *affective needs*: those needs which are related to achieving satisfactory relationships with other people and are associated with the need to establish that we mean something to others and are liked as people. *Transcendental leadership* consists in having transcendent motives and appealing to the transcendent motives of other people. Such a leader transcends his own selfishness, as his vocation invites him to procure human development, to provide meaning to the work of his followers, and to help them discover their personal vocation⁹⁰. This kind of leadership is believed to be *good* leadership, with “good” understood to mean: (1) the action satisfies another person's needs, (2) the action is directed toward helping, as far as possible, the other person to learn

⁸⁶ Cfr. PÉREZ LÓPEZ, J.A.; *El sentido de los conflictos éticos originados por el entorno en que opera la empresa*. Madrid: Ediciones Rialp, 1990.

⁸⁷ Cfr. POLO, L.; La amistad en Aristóteles. *Anuario Filosófico*. 32: 1999 477-485.

⁸⁸ Cfr. NEY, P.; “Charity as the Perfection of Natural Friendship in Aquinas” *Summa Theologiae. Lethbridge Undergraduate Research Journal*. 1(1) 2006: 1-8.

⁸⁹ Cfr. ARGANDOÑA, A. (2014b). “La ética en la empresa y la ética del directivo”, *Boletín de Estudios Económicos*. 69 (211) 2014: 9-23.

⁹⁰ Cfr. VÉLAZ, I. AND PASTORIZA, D.; “Business as a Vocation: The Business Leadership as a Vocation” *Paper presented at the Fifth International Symposium on Catholic Social Thought and Management Education*. Bilbao, Spain, 2003; ALCÁZAR GARCÍA, M.; FERREIRO DE BABOT, P.; *Managing People*. Barcelona: Ariel Publishing 2002.

(helping him to ‘do better what he has to do’), and (3) the action is intended to help the other person increase his moral virtues. This is what constitutes ‘love of benevolence’ —to wish good to the person loved— and here it is easy to see that love can and must be lived in firms for firms to operate efficiently, be attractive to those who take part in them, and act consistently in the long run⁹¹.

If the organizational leader were a *true* friend in the Polian sense, that is, one who exercises *transcendental leadership* through the possession of *transcendent* motives, referring to a genuine interest in the development and motives of the other person that goes beyond considering exclusively future effectiveness, and exercising those virtues inherent in a friend serving an “*other self*”, most importantly a radical love or self-gift, then we can expect better organizational functioning, that is to say, characterized by efficiency, effectiveness, and consistency (Pérez López, 1993). Consistency here refers to “agreement or harmony of all parts (...) at different times” or “the reliability or uniformity of successive results or events”, which in turn is a result of consistency in decision making, a decision that helps the leader acquire capabilities that will enable him to frame his decisions in such a way as to satisfy present needs without jeopardizing the satisfaction of other present and future needs (Argandoña, 2008.)

8. IMPLICATIONS OF POLO'S DISCERNMENT OF ARISTOTELIAN FRIENDSHIP FOR THE BUSINESS LEADER'S WORK OF GOVERNANCE

Now more than ever, the modern business organization is in need of a north star to guide it along paths of long-term sustainability and attainment of *human flourishing* for each of its members. *Characterological capital* (capital that gives emphasis to the growth in the moral virtues of the organizational members) thus takes center stage, in this day and age when huge corporate collapses have put typical utilitarian business models into question. Now more than ever, leaders are in need of developing *leadership capacity*, indispensable for directing others and making them commit long-term to a business project, not out of necessity, but rather because they like to, because

⁹¹ Cfr. ARGANDOÑA, A.; “Beyond Contracts: Love in Firms” *Journal of Business Ethics*. 99 2011: 77-85.

they learn and improve, and they can share their progress with someone else. The set of qualities that an executive ought to develop can be quite formidable: many complex professions demand enormous commitment and an enormous amount of preparation. More importantly, leading demands experience and the development of the virtues⁹².

It is believed that a successful, solid and lasting economic organization positively needs love to be exercised and practiced in and around it⁹³. Polo⁹⁴ highlights the superiority of Christian friendship because of its Christian love: and this has important implications for corporate governance. True love—which a true friend and leader is capable of—is *to wish good to someone* (*amare est velle allicui bonum*), for which reason the friend loves the beloved as *another self*, not because thereby he draws any benefit (although this happens to be a consequence of love of friendship) but principally because the beloved is loved as a person, capable of establishing relationships, in which, apart from benevolence, there is reciprocity and communication. Love of friendship is a selfless and ecstatic love: the friend-lover is in the beloved friend, and vice versa. The lover goes out of himself, but the intentionality of that act does not turn around himself, but rather rests in the beloved friend⁹⁵.

The implications of this for humanistic corporate leadership are manifold: (1) *Education for friendship*: we have seen how education for friendship is an added value in leadership training, given that leadership involves a series of skills, attitudes and values that develop through friendship experiences, and given that values found in friendship merge with those found in leadership⁹⁶; (2) *Education for moral leadership*: The task of the leader nowadays has shifted to

⁹² Cfr. CANALS, J.; La mejora del gobierno corporativo: algunas reflexiones desde la crisis financiera. *Revista de Contabilidad y Dirección*. 10 2010: 11-33; LLANO, C.; “Caracterología del directivo al inicio del Siglo XXI” *Revista Empresa y Humanismo*. 5(2/02) 2002: 321-344.

⁹³ Cfr. ARGANDOÑA, A.; “Beyond Contracts: Love in Firms” *Journal of Business Ethics*. 99 2011: 77-85.

⁹⁴ Cfr. POLO, L.; “La amistad en Aristóteles”, ed.cit.

⁹⁵ Cfr. RIVERA, A.; *El Amor de Amistad*. Tesis Doctoral. Pamplona: Universidad de Navarra, 2003.

⁹⁶ Cfr. ROMERO-IRIBAS, A.M. AND MARTÍNEZ-PRIEGO, C.; “Developing leadership through education for friendship” *Procedia Social and Behavioral Sciences*. 15 2011: 2248-2252.

sense-making and creating new moral relationships among co-workers, between leader and follower. A moral executive must find ways to focus the organization's attention on ethics and values and to infuse the organization with principles that will guide the actions of all employees⁹⁷; (3) *Cultivation of the virtues of the friend-leader*. Since the ultimate test of virtue theory is whether the character traits discussed above are practiced in day to day business activities, this paper has important implications for human resources management and leadership training; after all, hiring and promoting managers with strong character is essential, for management ultimately sets the "tone at the top" and the example they set can have a major impact on business practices within and outside the firm (Racelis, 2013).

9. EPILOGUE

The friendship of the Christian business leader—which goes beyond the *natural friendship* considered by Aristotle—should lead him to reflect Jesus Christ faithfully and heroically, communing with Him and fulfilling his mission of communicating this treasure. The virtues of the *friend-leader* reach their peak in the charity of the believer, which in turn enables him to practice the "new commandment" of Jesus: it helps him to understand that charity is not simply discovering Christ in the others, but moves him to accept at its very root the commitment of impersonating Christ, of exerting every effort to imitate Him and look like Him; better yet, being another Christ, Christ Himself⁹⁸. Only in this way can we understand why Vázquez de Prada affirmed: "From the mutual understanding of friends derive the sovereign benefits of friendship. Through it, the feeling of abandonment and the solitude of individuals can be overcome and quietened. Insecurities for the future are overturned, and relief and optimism take over. Such friendships inspire confidence that results from the *friendly hand* (*mano amiga*) as well as a brotherly head. For both human and divine undertakings, we are able to count on not just the mere sum of individualities, but rather the synergistic result that comes from friendship's multiplicative effect of

⁹⁷ Cfr. (TREVINO, ET AL., *op. cit.*

⁹⁸ Cfr. ECHEVARRÍA, J.; *Paths to God: Building a Christian Life in the 21st Century*. New York: Scepter Publishers 2010.

adding energy and efficacy”⁹⁹. Likewise, only in this way can we understand why Lewis described *friendship* as exhibiting “a glorious *nearness by resemblance* to Heaven itself where the very multitude of the blessed (which no man can number) increases the fruition which each has of God”¹⁰⁰.

This paper has endeavored to show that Polo’s essay on Aristotle’s notions of *friendship* in his *Amistad en Aristóteles* has important implications for humanistic corporate governance, in particular through Polo’s discernment of the nature and virtues of friendship as they may relate to leadership. Concretely, one can draw those virtues that are natural to him as a human being and as an authentic friend, which at the same time accompany his *transcendental leadership* of self-gift and service to others. Firstly, there are the chief moral virtues—or the cardinal virtues—of: (1) prudence, (2) justice, (3) fortitude, (4) temperance. In addition, there are the virtues of: (5) humility, (6) veracity, and (7) love, or charity. It is hoped that, by highlighting these characteristics of a *true friend* contained in *Amistad en Aristóteles*—especially the superiority of Christian charity over the *natural friendship* notions of Aristotle—we have provided clear indications for how the authentic *friend-leader* turns out to be the ideal moral leader who will bring about that much-desired *human flourishing* in organizational members and, by extension, successful business outcomes. The virtues identified here corroborate the literature that says that a values-based leader (in the sense of the virtuous *friend-leader* discussed here) serves others in a positive way, that is to say, provides positive impacts and helps others to flourish. Indeed, “transcendental leadership”, i.e., leadership by way of transcendent motives (in addition to extrinsic and intrinsic motives), whereby the leader makes himself have a genuine interest in the development of and in contributing to the good of the follower, has great potential for a better organizational functioning, for a more humanistic corporate governance.

⁹⁹ VÁZQUEZ DE PRADA, A.; *Estudio sobre la amistad*. Madrid: Rialp, 1956, pp. 209-210.

¹⁰⁰ LEWIS, C.S.; *The Four Loves*, 1958 Retrieved from <https://www.calvin.edu/~pribeiro/DCM-Lewis-2009/Lewis/the-four-loves.pdf>, p. 57.

AIMS AND SCOPE

The *Journal of Polian Studies* aims to encourage scientific cooperation and communication between researchers and academics concerning important themes of anthropology, metaphysics, and theory of knowledge. The *Journal of Polian Studies* focuses on and is inspired by Leonardo Polo's profound, wide-ranging and original philosophical proposals. Our principal aim is to publish articles that are models of interdisciplinary work and scientific accuracy, thus allowing readers to keep abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary philosophy.



Leonardo Polo
Institute of Philosophy

