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# Transcendental Anthropology and the Foundation of Human Dignity

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**ABSTRACT:** Most of the thinkers of the twentieth century demand, more or less explicitly, a peculiar ontology for anthropology, distinguishing between the cosmos and mankind, between things and people, in order to achieve a vision of the unity of man and to substantiate their inalienable rights, universally recognized by the UN in 1948. The transcendental anthropology of Polo, with its ontological expansion and its recognition of the uniqueness of the human person, is not only intrinsically free and intelligent, but also capable of giving an adequate scenario to ground human dignity in the foundations of being.

**KEYWORDS:** Human Dignity, Transcendental Anthropology, Uniqueness, Freedom, Foundation



The tragic experiences of the World Wars led to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sponsored by the UN in 1948. Since then much of the newly created constitutions recognize the inviolability of human dignity. However, the drafters of the declaration made an effort to bypass the theoretical grounds on which those rights are founded on the fear that theoretical differences would have postponed or made infeasible such a recognition. Six decades later the development of a solid and universally acceptable foundation of human dignity and fundamental right is still pending. It is a complicated issue that seems to require a new advancement in ontology and philosophical anthropology.

Well, the thesis to be developed here is that the extension of the ontology proposed by Leonardo Polo and subsequent development of a transcendental anthropology provide a framework to develop this foundation for human dignity and for the universality of human rights.

## 1. HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE FACE OF A PROBLEMATIC ANTHROPOLOGY

It was Max Scheler early in the last century who diagnosed the infirmity. Despite the rise of science devoted to the study of human beings, regardless of the increased volume of information that we have about ourselves, and lacking a unified vision, that never before than at the present time has it become so problematic to discern what it means to be human<sup>1</sup>.

Current anthropological fragmentation comes from varied and complex causes, including the diversity of sciences that deal with the absence of a true interdisciplinary work. But that dispersion is motivated more radically by the crisis and even denial of human nature, the basis upon which it has supported its universality, and especially for the superficial and minimal thought about being and the person, an area of human reality more profound than that of its nature. In order to get a unified view of anthropology, that which is required primarily, is a unifying principle. The method to find it cannot be

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1 SCHELER, M., *El puesto del hombre en el cosmos*, 6ed. Losada, Buenos Aires 1967, p. 24.



other than the return to the ever new, basic human experience<sup>2</sup> that allows access to realistic proposals. In every human being, there is a consciousness of a dignity that one begins to experience that nobody can snatch away, an inner freedom that is possessed, the absolute value that everyone has by virtue of being. This individual consciousness was experienced simultaneously in the middle of last century by many people at once, which brought about in early 1947 the effort by the Commission of Human Rights of the United Nations to begin to prepare a universal declaration. Jacques Maritain tells that in one of the joint meetings of experts from the world's top minds of the moment<sup>3</sup>, they were summoned to investigate the theoretical issues that might raise questions, and how one of the attendees expressed surprise to find out that people who had thoughts not only different, but also contrary, would agree to write the same list of rights. They replied: "Yes, we agree with those rights provided that we are not asked "why," stating that they were opposing the "whys" that could confront them<sup>4</sup>.

## 2. THE CONVENIENCE OF SUBSTANTIATING DIGNITY

The failure to substantiate the text raises several problems. The first is practical, because although experts say they do not have the same reasons, it seemed to them that they lacked an explanation for their common adherence. Now if they proposed a list of rights for global acceptance, what hope might they have to obtain it if they had circumvented all the reasons that advised it? But the main problem, according to Palacios, is the threatened and provisional status that true opinions have that are collected in a spontaneous or pre-scientific manner without being properly grounded<sup>5</sup>. Without proper grounding in personal rights and human dignity, even though they

2 Cfr. SCOLA, A., *La experiencia humana elemental. La veta profunda del magisterio de Juan Pablo II*, ed. Encuentro, 2005.

3 Among them were: the philosopher, historian and politician Benedetto Italian Croce, the thinker and Hindu leader Mahatma Gandhi, the English novelist Aldous Huxley, the English also, Harold Laski and political scientist, diplomat and historian Salvador de Madariaga Spanish and French philosophers Pierre Teilhard de Chardin and Jacques Maritain.

4 Cfr. MARITAIN, J. et alii, *Autor de la nouvelle Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme*, Ed. du Sagittaire, Paris 1949 : Introduction.

5 Cfr. PALACIOS, J.M., *La condición de lo humano*, ed. Encuentro, Madrid 2013, p.36.

may be universally recognized, they are exposed to decay and to the discretion of changeable human opinions that are subject to merely positivistic interpretations. In fact, in past decades, in addition to the fundamental rights of life, education, freedom to marry, and religious freedom of expression, we are witnessing an increasing proliferation of rights of the "second, third or fourth generation, " going as far as wanting to turn desires into rights. They may present contradictions such that under some of these additional rights, fundamental rights are violated, as in the case of the right to life of an unborn child that is completely opposed to the recently invoked right to abortion. This concern is commonly held among lawyers<sup>6</sup>, particularly among those who are warning of this inconsistency in the dissociation between two fields that feed off of each other. Therefore to continue to maintain such a praxis, which previously had an implicit foundation in dignity that has been silenced or omitted, is now founded on reasons that place in danger-sooner or later- the continuity of such a practice.

The dispersion of contemporary thought and rationality demands a solid philosophical foundation of dignity in "something" prior to action. However, this heuristic requires a way to clarify that previous "something." What would come before human nature or natural law? The question lies in whether human rights refer ultimately to human nature or to an even deeper reality. To suggest anything easy that leads Palacios to recognize that, although there are those who know intuitively, there are no convincing theoretical explanations for such a serious and necessary issue<sup>7</sup>.

As Starck, a German constitutionalist says, the starting point to obtain a more solid foundation is the recognition of an irrefutable historical fact that valuing human life in Western culture is much higher than in other cultures, and in the genesis of such a high appraisal, must recognize the influence of Christianity<sup>8</sup>. According to his proposal, a foundation of dignity, provided that the notion does not lose its original meaning, must rely on its historical itinerary, namely its nuclear anchoring in the Christian message, subsequent

6 Cfr. FERNÁNDEZ SEGADO, Fr. (Coord.), *Dignidad de la persona, derechos fundamentales, justicia constitucional*, ed. Dykinson, Madrid 2008.

7 Cfr. PALACIOS, J.M., *La condición de lo humano*, p. 61.

8 Cfr. STARCK, Ch., *La dignidad del hombre como garantía constitucional, en especial en el Derecho alemán*, en FERNÁNDEZ SEGADO, Fr. (Coord.), *Dignidad de la persona, derechos fundamentales, justicia constitucional*, pp. 241-247.

philosophical formulation and, finally, the requirement of legal security. Indeed, over the centuries there has been a development of the notion of human dignity, especially within humanism, of a process of secularization in which the concepts of freedom and dignity go beyond theological reasons and reaches philosophically explained rational arguments that are available to any intelligence. Among them is the important and well-known conviction of Kant who maintained that the person is to be treated always as an end and never as a means. In other words, consciousness and explanations for human dignity are a heritage of human thought.

Upon the central basis that gives rise to the high esteem that the person has in European culture, now a more rigorous, thorough and universal foundation is claimed by humanism founded on the natural law. To continue on that basis it is necessary to take into account the various findings and developments that human intelligence has been developing over the centuries. Among them modernity has emphasized a radical difference between nature and freedom, between the natural and the rational<sup>9</sup>. Modernity, reflecting the legacy of the experiences of the preceding centuries, argued that freedom is something deeper than free will as characteristic of some human acts<sup>10</sup>. Intuition, on the other hand, is an affordable access to basic human experience since everyone can recognize that when you do things freely, "because a person wants to" even without apparent reasons to support it, you know that your love is prior to your performance, and that free will is what later will volunteer to act. And even if modern philosophers have not achieved an adequate development of freedom, and despite the absence of naturalisms and extreme biologisms, this has no doubt helped to entrench the belief that what separates him from the rest of Nature is a more radical and profound difference than what has been developed in the classical tradition.

Attempts to further consider nature and natural law as the last enclave of dignity have been made,<sup>11</sup> but also there are great difficulties being waged against its survival in the spiritual climate of our time. In addition to this, enclosed in the background there is a patent prob-

9 Cfr. en SPAEMANN, *Lo natural y lo racional*, Rialp, Madrid, 1989.

10 Cfr. GARAY (de), J., *El nacimiento de la libertad. Precedentes de la libertad moderna*, ed. Thémata, Sevilla 2006.

11 Cfr. MARITAIN, J., *El hombre y el Estado*, 2ed. Encuentro, Madrid 2002, pp. 87, 90-91 y 92-95.

lem. Palacios has analyzed some of them, including one of the most profound from an anthropological point of view as described in the following words: "One of the most obvious problems that is always posed (with respect to the basic dignity in nature) is how to unite the concept of human nature with the affirmation of freedom. Indeed, if nature is such, as Aristotle writes early in his *Politics*<sup>12</sup>, how can men have an imposed nature and at the same time the capacity to assert himself for his own ends? How could something be by nature and be at the same time free to arrive to become it? How is it possible to conceive, to use the expression of Millán-Puelles, the synthesis of human nature **and freedom?**"<sup>13</sup>.

Moreover, nature, despite being initially regarded as the beginning of operations in living beings, ended up being considered in a way immovable, that which appears opposed to the enormous human capacity for innovation and creativity and with the unpredictability of history. Modern and contemporary thought assumes the importance of time and culture in anthropology. It would be enough to quote Dilthey, Bergson or Heidegger. After the birth of cultural anthropology as a science split off from the rest, we have witnessed for decades the debate between nature and culture. Those who have been the first to defend it, but who are at a disadvantage with respect to the culturalists, have even come to deny that humans even have a nature. The truth is that in this endless debate, affected in its roots by dualism, nature and culture are both considered as two previously constituted realities fighting against each other or refusing each other. And that protracted dispute, if it has been falsely closed, should not come to conclude what is permanent and up to what point that which is innate in the human being is capable of being shaped.

After the sterility of the nature-versus-culture discussion, and challenging the prejudice spoken about by the natural law of modernity as well as the postmodern decision to eliminate the notion of philosophical and legal language, what seems clear is that what is said in tradition about it does not explain everything. From nature it is hard to explain freedom and the ability to rule over the natural man attained by science and technology. In addition, the metaphysical tradition raises the difficulty of developing an anthropology of

12 Cfr. ARISTÓTELES, *Política* I, 2, 1252 b32.

13 Cfr. PALACIOS, J.M., *La condición de lo humano*, pp. 49-50.

knowledge from the philosophical language of the cosmos, making it a secondary dependent of that philosophy. And in some ways the anthropological drama of modernity, despite opening new themes, contributed to the cultural roots from which it came, freedom, the intimacy of subjectivity, its ability to project creativity, etc., try to develop the same philosophy that explains the Cosmos. Polo has noted that, unlike the exponential advancement of science, philosophy has not brought about new ideas for centuries. Different authors are shuffling in varied ways the same elements that address the study of the cosmos and man from a symmetrical perspective<sup>14</sup>.

Throughout the twentieth century, however, it has been noted with increasing clarity the need for a new conceptual framework to speak about human beings. Among other issues, we sense that anthropological relationships are crucial, much more than metaphysical accidents that are called ontological relations, though still without specifying its location<sup>15</sup>. In the words of Lopez Quintás, "the schemes of "cause and effect" or "action-passion," are mono-directional, deterministic, (a hit on the table, that inevitably causes a determined effect, a certain sound). Instead, the scheme "appeal-response" is circular, and promotes freedom (a man who makes a suggestion to another is what is appealing to the other to take and answer the option)"<sup>16</sup>. That is, what is being asked for is an extension of ontology that distinguishes between things and persons, between the being of the cosmos, and the being of each man, the development of a special ontology that allows for anthropology and freedom.

Moreover, dignity has to do with each individual human being and with that profound characteristic of his: freedom. Maybe that's why the vast majority of humanists of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, instead of talking about man in the abstract have taken up again the old notion of person, to return, in the face of the barbarism of the world wars, to the dignity of every person by virtue of being. Its objective moves along the lines of rebuilding humanism, renewing itself around the

14 Cfr. POLO, L., *Antropología trascendental*, I, p. 90; *Planteamiento de la antropología trascendental*, en FALGUERAS, I., GARCÍA, J., (Coords.), *Antropología y transcendencia*, Universidad de Málaga 2008, pp. 11-14. También en *Miscelánea poliana*, n. 4.

15 Cfr. ZUBIRI, X., *Respectividad de lo real*, en «Realitas» III-IV (1979) 14-43.

16 LÓPEZ QUINTÁS, A., *La antropología dialógica de F. Ebner*, en SAHAGÚN LUCAS (DE), J., *Antropologías del s. XX*, e. Sigueme, Salamanca 1979, p. 152.

singular person, hence the nickname that has come to identify certain groups: personalism. In this sense it is said that, after the anthropological turn of modern philosophy, there has been a personalistic anthropological rotation or shifting of Humanism to Personalism<sup>17</sup>.

All this movement seeks to distinguish between nature and person, and as the European Humanism focused on nature and the natural law, a draft permitting ontological personalism that goes beyond nature, to reach a radical anthropological level: personal being. However, for the classic court of abstract thought, partly convinced that human intelligence knows only the general and abstract, and the concrete because the individual belongs solely to sensory knowledge, intends to repair personalistic thought, in the sense that it is considered impossible to substantiate something universal in the individual, because each of these are specific individuals. Are they the ones who still think that it is only nature that is common to all, who can establish universality?

### 3. CONTRIBUTIONS OF POLIAN TRANSCENDENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY

These pressing speculative needs put us in a position to assess the scope of the extension of the ontology brought about by Leonardo Polo, from which there arises a transcendental anthropology.

As is well known of Polo, beginning from the real difference between the *esse-essentia* and the predicamental and the transcendental plane, in the sixties, he undertakes the task of applying these distinctions to anthropology allowing for an expansion of the metaphysics of Aquinas, and by outlining an ontology for the person different from the Cosmos<sup>18</sup>. It is an extension of ontology that allows a development of a new anthropology that opens wide into a joint ontological triad: body, soul and spirit. Transcendental anthropology is based on an expansion of ontology that transcends metaphysics and becomes an anthropology anchored in being (*esse*)<sup>19</sup>.

17 Cfr. DOMINGO MORATALLA, A., *Un humanismo del siglo XX: el personalismo*, ed. Cincel, Madrid, 1985.

18 Cfr. POLO, L., *La esencia del hombre*, Eunsa, Pamplona, 2011, pp. 90-98.

19 Cfr. POLO, L., *Por qué una antropología transcendental*, en *Presente y futuro del hombre*, Rialp, Madrid 1993, pp. 142-194.

Applying the human distinction between the essence and the act of being (esse), the person, the who individualized, appears as the act of being of every man, the human esse, as distinct from its nature, will become essentialized through self-determination. However, in the cosmos, every real substance, does not therefore have its own esse but participates in a single act of being that belongs to the cosmos, a mere whole of all intra-cosmic beings. Along this line of thought, neither the act of being of every man, which is his personal, nor his essence, are the same as the act of being and essence of the cosmos, because the personal act of being of man is free and his essence is capable of acquiring habits<sup>20</sup>, while the act of being of the cosmos is determined by fixed laws, constituted by studying the causes that metaphysics studies. According to this philosophical development that orders the findings of the personalistic phenomenon and coincides with Zubirian<sup>21</sup> exposure of substantivity, the entire cosmos is a single act of being, while each person has their own. And that is to be a person.

In this context we say that the main difficulty talking about the person is rooted in that the person has to do with being, not the essence, and in that sense is not capable of being grasped with generic concepts. The person, each person is unique and unrepeatable. Polo states that the person is that which is new along the lines of Hannah Arendt, according to whom, with each birth something unprecedented appears in the world, that philosophically speaking is explained because each human being has their own act of being, a radical enclave of intelligence and freedom. And the reason that Polo speaks of transcendental anthropology is because the person is an act of being and that which the act being refers to is of a transcendental order. Although this order is also present in metaphysics, it is distinct from the transcendental order of anthropology that is situated at another level, the level of freedom. To explain freedom philosophically, a broadening of ontology is required using another, more appropriate language proper to its object of study, an issue that is called for by all personalistic thinkers of the twentieth century. You could say, from a grammatical point of view that metaphysics is different than anthro-

20 Cfr. POLO, L., *La coexistencia del hombre*, en *Actas de las XXV Reuniones Filosóficas* de la Universidad de Navarra, t. I, Pamplona, 1991, pp. 33-48.

21 Cfr. ZUBIRI, X., *Estructura dinámica de la realidad*, Alianza editorial, Madrid 1989, pp. 50, 90-91 y 201.

pology, because metaphysics deals with substances and anthropology deals with pronouns: I, you, and we.

According to this anthropology it is necessary to distinguish levels in the transcendental order. In a summary way, you could say that Polo proposes extending metaphysics considering that all beings have an act of being. However, it does not entail an act in the participation of the being of God. Polo considers the doctrine of participation, the theory in which most neo-thomists have supported themselves, as insufficient to enter into the knowledge of being, since it recognizes that Creation is not only about the essence, but also about the very act of being that brings forth creatures into existence. Going one step further, he distinguishes the act of being of the Cosmos, which he calls the first creature, from the act of being of each man, the second creature, and ultimately the act of being of God. He definitively states that participation is not a sufficient enough basis from which to point out the novelty of bringing a new being that comes into existence, either from the big-bang of the Cosmos, as well as the emergence of a new human life.

In other words, the fact the creatures have an act of being is not because they participate in the same divine Being, but because God has created them to exist for themselves, since creation consists mainly in the fact that God creates the act of being and not only the essence of beings. In a second step, Polo notes that the human being is to be distinguished from the being of the Cosmos. Regarding the latter, after considering the multiplicity of problems which one could suppose, that each substance would have its own act of being, and observing the great unity of the cosmos, he concludes that everything as a whole, has a single act of being, from which all inert and living substances of nature participate. That is, the doctrine of the participation of the act of being is easily framed within cosmic nature, where each one of the substances has an act of being that participates in the one act of being of the Cosmos. It is not so for the so-called human being, who he called the second creature, which is a person. The person is unique because each man has his own incommunicable act of being, the very reason why medieval thinkers described the person as incommunicable. In other words, in as much as it is distinct from the essence, the human *esse* is the person, the other co-principle, who actualizes the individualized nature of each man that is transmitted



by his parents<sup>22</sup>. Since the person is the act of being, and therefore transcendental, actualizing all the formal perfections of each man, it can be said that the soul is personal and that the body is personal or that the whole man is personal, but not in the sense that the person may be the "all" in the sense that if it were missing one of its constituent elements, for example the body after death, then it would cease to be a person<sup>23</sup>.

Through careful observation, Polo continues declaring that man is distinct from the Cosmos both in his act of being, which is free, as well as in his essence, which is capable of habits. On the other hand, he highlights the inclusion of the relationship of the very act of being, describing this act of being as co-existence, after affirming that a person can not be alone, because it would be a misfortune not having someone to communicate with and to give oneself to.

Moreover, in as much as the knowledge of the act of being (*esse*) is concerned, if the history of philosophy is reviewed, its best development is found in the theory of the transcendentals, that is, those properties of being as being, that add more knowledge about the act of being, even though they become one with it. Thus, unity, truth, goodness or beauty, considered as the most important ones, are no different than being itself, but they help us to know it better from different perspectives. Hence, if specific transcendentals on the human level are distinguished, there exist other characteristic transcendentals that are personal<sup>24</sup>. That is, similar to how classical philosophy distinguished a series of transcendental properties of being – unity, truth, goodness, beauty– so the act of being has its own transcendental properties. For example, in the person, that which is good, is above all love. And as for freedom<sup>25</sup> or intelligence, there are tran-

22 Cfr. POLO, L., *La esencia del hombre* en FALGUERAS, I., GARCÍA, J., (Coords.), *Antropología y transcendencia* Universidad de Málaga 2008, pp. 31-50. Also *Miscelánea poliana*, n. 4.

23 This has been one of the burdens that has dragged the philosophical tradition after the famous definition of Boethius, including Thomas Aquinas, until he manages to overcome it. Cfr. CASTILLA DE CORTÁZAR, Bl., *Noción de Persona y antropología transcendental: Si el alma separada es o no persona, si la persona es el todo o el esse del hombre: de Boecio a Polo*, en «Miscelánea Poliana», 40 (2013) pp. 62-94.

24 Cfr. POLO, L., *Antropología transcendental I: La persona humana*, Eunsa, Pamplona 1999; 2003<sup>2</sup>, pp. 203-227.

25 Cfr. POLO, L., *Libertas transcendentalis*, en «Anuario filosófico» 25 (1993/3) 703-716.

scendental dimensions as well, not in such a way that they are reduced to being powers of nature, but that are more radically properties of the very same personal act of being.

In other words, given that the act of being is transcendental, because it actualizes all of the formal perfections, the person in as much as it is the act of being, also has transcendental properties. Recall that transcendentals do not have anything to do with essences, but are properties of being as being: being and all that is, by just being, is good, true, beautiful. If we consider that being a person is of another order or of a higher ontological level, then we can glimpse properties that belong exclusively to the personal being, and therefore are also good, true and beautiful. In the case of man, anthropological transcendentals, as proposed by Polo could be: being-with or co-existence, freedom, intelligence, donation or effusion, filiation.

**In this sense, Polo's development of transcendental freedom takes on special importance, especially in light of freedom's relevance throughout modern and postmodern thought.** Polo distinguishes between the native or transcendental freedom of the will that has the ability to possess moral habits or virtues. That is, one thing is the will as a faculty of the soul, a power capable of habits, and the other "free someone" that activates it, moving it to action. Freedom as a characteristic of the personal act of being, which at the same time is integrated with the intelligence of truth and love, is no less important than the transcendentality of the intelligence (which Zubiri masterfully develops before him), nor the donal aperture of the person, in which love consists.

The transcendental level would also be the level at which to place the intelligence, in as much as it is light that, illuminating data received from the senses, enables abstraction but, above all, that captures the essence of things, making them real, alive. Aristotle already noticed the difference between the agent intellect, which is act, and the passive intellect that is capable of possessing intellectual habits. If we ask what the relationship is between the Agent Intellect and the person, Polo answers saying that what Aristotle called the Agent Intellect, could be called the person. Therefore, one can conclude that neither intelligence nor freedom is properly of the essence, but transcendental properties of personal being, as is the good or beauty with respect to being in general. And as mentioned, to these two properties or transcendentals of the person must be added another at the

same level, inserted into the relational aperture: gift, love. In other words, the good, a transcendental property of being, considered generally as being, in anthropology is called LOVE. From the ontological point of view, love would necessarily be described as a radical or an anthropological transcendental.

The human person has its own and exclusive powers for knowledge and self-knowledge, it can also acquire self-determination deciding by itself being a free author of its own biography. As Viladrich says **“this is the moment when we get into the mystery. None of us generated himself from nothing. No one is his own creator nor his own father. Nevertheless each one of us feels inside that he is that unique person, self-possessed, capable of love and be loved in his exclusive subjectivity. This inner experience leads us to the question about who is the one that gave us that unrepeatable and excellent being among all the other being in cosmos, ho was able to create us from nothing and create us as unique persons”**<sup>26</sup>. It can be deduced that this unrepeatable act received comes from God. That act of being and those granted powers that he owns are the deep reason of the inalienable rights. Here precisely lies the human dignity that inseparable is responsible freedom to develop and make grow the gifts given.

#### 4. HUMAN DIGNITY AND TRANSCENDENTAL ANTHROPOLOGY

From transcendental anthropology clear and distinct possibilities open up for the foundation of human dignity and its inalienable rights, not so much at the level of nature, but precisely in the person. The person is its own act of being, and the property of every human being.

Human person, consider as the act of being of each man, is precisely what makes it be unique and repeatable and not only an individual of a higher species. That act of being is what makes person as an inner core from which all actions comes from, a being which he is the only owner so nobody can posses it unless is given by him. Here lies his dignity.

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<sup>26</sup> VILADRICH, P.J., *El valor de los amores familiares*, ed. Rialp, Madrid, 2005, p. 33.

From this new perspective, the ultimate foundation of human dignity, that something prior to action and the guarantor of inviolability, would come to be something deeper and interior to its specific nature. It would undeniably be the person. Human dignity, that every person has precisely because they are unique and unrepeatable, is a non-transferable dignity. Nevertheless, while enjoying it, every human being can also say that it is universal. However, this appears to deal with another way of universality, universality at an ontological level that, without annulling anything said above, reaches a deeper level and allows for a more solid moral foundation, because, ultimately this would not be such if were not to host the freedom to love.

Transcendental anthropology, thanks to its ontological expansion and the recognition of the uniqueness of the human person who is intrinsically free, intelligent and capable of giving, offers an adequate scenario to support human dignity in being.

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## AIMS AND SCOPE

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